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Scholars have identified the abuse of state resources as one of the primary indicators 
of whether a country will democratize. Clientelist networks are critical to how incumbents 
exploit state assets to remain in power. When the informal relationships of clientelist parties 
undermine the formal institutions of the state, the regime is no longer democratic, even 
where competitive elections take place. Alternately, if a ruling party in such hybrid regimes 
loses its monopoly on state power, it creates an opening for other parties and social groups to 
push for democratization. Mexico and Turkey are critical case studies on how clientelist 
parties function and their effect upon political regimes. In both cases, informal relationships 
of clientelism have endured even as the economic and political conditions that gave rise to it 
have changed. Changes in housing policy in Mexico and Turkey illustrate how clientelist 
parties have used this critical need to exert control over society through different economic 
conditions. As such, it is crucial to understanding the political regimes of each country. Title 
formalization is a political process: the extent that this process is independently managed by 
the state bureaucracy for the benefit of citizens regardless of party affiliation or used for 
partisan ends to win elections is an indicator of the prevalence of informal practices 
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detrimental to democracy. The case studies show, in Mexico, despite the ubiquity of 
clientelism, a massive program of state housing subsidies remained independent of partisan 
manipulation. In Turkey, its program of housing subsidies and title formalization were 
distributed on a partisan basis by a federal agency that was increasingly subsumed by a single 
party. A comparison shows how the state has become more independent from clientelism in 
Mexico while in Turkey the housing authority is enmeshed in the clientelist practices of the 
incumbent party. The case studies show that the independence of the state bureaucracy from 
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INTRODUCTION  
 In the early morning of August 17, 1999, my wife, then just a young woman in her 
early twenties, was visiting her aunt at their summerhouse near Erdek, Turkey. She was 
talking with her cousin when the violent shaking of a 7.6 magnitude earthquake rudely 
interrupted them. Her cousin darted to the bedrooms to wake his parents and sister. She, 
unsure of what to do, ran outside to the terrace on the roof; if the house collapsed at least, it 
would not fall on top of her. They were lucky, the re-bar and cement house her father and 
grandfather had built held. Across the Sea of Marmara, in Izmit Turkey, a little more than 
100 miles away, people at the epicenter of the seism were not as fortunate. In its aftermath, 
the earthquake left 17,127 dead and 600,000 people homeless. My wife spent the remainder 
of her trip sleeping outdoors, each aftershock a frightening reminder of how precious and 
precarious shelter can be.  
 Other newly industrialized nations have experienced similar disasters and death tolls 
as a result of poorly planned housing. On 19 September 1985, an 8.0 magnitude earthquake 
caused 10,000 deaths in Mexico City. It is still unknown exactly how many people lost their 
homes, but most estimates are around 250,000. The high death toll in both instances is 
attributable primarily to poorly engineered housing built on unstable land.  
As countries across the globe continue to urbanize, the basic problem of housing continues 
to be a challenge for millions of people. The percentage of the world's population that is 
urban increased from 33.61% in 1960 to 54.8% in 2017; a staggering 21.19% increase (The 
World Bank, 2019). The challenges and opportunities presented by urbanization will be 
paramount in the next coming decades.  
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 Turkey and Mexico provide a fascinating study in how two countries have grappled 
with the ramifications of rapid urbanization. Much of the housing stock in both countries is 
informal. As was common in industrializing countries during the mid-twentieth century, 
people built their own homes on land without title. This housing stock mostly does not 
adhere to any building code or planning regulations. Informal housing is inherently political: 
it is the state that grants ownership and recognizes a title. In a rush to develop, governments 
tolerated these illegal self-built houses and the resulting unplanned neighborhoods in 
exchange for cheap labor and malleable political support. This informal construction is an 
essential factor in the development of Turkey and Mexico and is crucial to understanding the 
growth and trajectory of the political regimes of each country.  
 Political considerations help explain the explosive growth of informal housing 
developments. According to the scholarship reviewed below, permitting substandard 
informal housing was a deliberate political choice of the elites in both nations. These 
informal settlements gave rise to informal political institutions that would shape the regimes 
they inhabited. In each country, following the creation of the respective modern republics in 
the first decades of the twentieth-century, politics was dominated by populism. Political 
parties in both countries relied on the mobilization of the urban masses. However, consistent 
with populism, they maintained elite control of the state and prevented the full political 
incorporation of either industrial workers or middle classes into decision-making. Politics in 
the most populous cities centered on party bosses providing resources and protection for the 
migrants from the countryside in exchange for acquiescence at least, if not loyalty. Mexico 
City and Istanbul spawned networks of patrons who could protect informal settlements in 
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exchange for political support. The massive populations of Mexico City and Istanbul meant 
control of these patronage networks had ramifications for control of the state not just locally 
but nationally. Protecting informal settlements and other goods and services became a critical 
way not just for individual politicians but the functioning of political parties. Crucially, 
successful political leaders vied for support not primarily through promising policy programs 
but by providing access to goods and services paid for with the selective distribution of state 
resources. For the people who lived in newly built, informal settlements in Istanbul and 
Mexico City politics, was about securing the particularistic material benefits for their 
communities and not policy initiatives that would distribute resources more broadly.  
 Thus, the urban workers who lived there were mobilized for political support but not 
incorporated into democratic control of the state. Populist leaders in both countries 
mobilized the urban constituencies to gain political power but prevented the full 
incorporation of these groups into political decision-making. Rapid urbanization and the 
subsequent creation of informal housing in Istanbul and Mexico City left residents 
vulnerable to political manipulation. Recent migrant household's lack of legal tenure to the 
land they occupied exacerbated the inherent inequality of urbanization. It cultivated a type 
of political linkage known as clientelism that was key to gaining the votes of the masses while 
maintaining elite control of the state and its resources. 
 The earthquakes were critical junctures in both Mexico and Turkey. They each 
revealed corruption and prompted concerted calls for change. However, to whom the 
population directed its anger and called for reforms have varied in the two different 
countries. In Mexico, well-organized housing advocacy groups combined with other groups 
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to push for democratic reforms that led to the distribution of state power to multiple parties. 
In Turkey, meanwhile, much of the anger went against established parties. It led to the 
incorporation of a populist Islamist party without a fundamental examination of the 
clientelist structures as the center of how the state-provided services. 
 Firstly, the carnage of the earthquakes created a call for housing reform. Political 
parties have seized upon the formalization process and the subsidies that accompany it to 
reward party loyalty. Thus, the use of state power for electoral support has remained a crucial 
facet of the regimes in both Mexico and Turkey. However, in Mexico, this meant the 
distribution of resources to three parties vying with each other for power, whereas in Turkey, 
a single party monopolized the political benefits of the formalization process. 
 Scholars have identified the abuse of state resources as one of the primary indicators 
of whether a country will democratize. Building on that work, this thesis argues that 
clientelist networks are critical to how incumbents exploit state assets to remain in power. 
Though clientelist parties rely on elections, clientelist parties inherently work to undermine 
democratic control of the state. A clientelist party's oversight of collective resources and legal 
enforcement enables it to coerce individuals to the extent that its rule can reach the entirety 
of society. The central assertion of this paper is that the clientelist distribution of state 
resources is fundamentally coercive and is contrary to independent democratic control of the 
state. Alternately, if a single party is no longer able to monopolize the use of state power, it 
creates an opening for other parties and social groups to push for democratization. The 
ability of a single party to dominate the state can make a regime authoritarian, even while 
formal democratic institutions remain in place. In other words, when the informal 
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institutions of partisan clientelist networks supersede and subvert the formal democratic 
institutions that determine control of the state, it allows incumbents to abuse state power to 
the extent that the regime becomes authoritarian. 
 Toward this end, this thesis will examine the mechanics of how clientelist parties 
function. It will first review the literature on clientelism. Specifically, it will look at how 
clientelism is defined, and how clientelist parties in democratic and authoritarian regimes 
differ from parties in established democratic regimes that offer broad-based programs to 
citizens regardless of party affiliation. Of particular importance is how clientelist parties are 
motivated not by ideology but by the goal of holding power and collecting rents for their 
adherents. Next, it will examine the literature on democratic, authoritarian, and hybrid 
regimes. It will review the definition of competitive authoritarian regimes, a particular subset 
of hybrid regimes. In these regimes elections for executive power are contested, but the 
appropriation of state resources for partisan gains makes the elections so unfair that they 
cannot be considered democratic. Next, it will turn to how parties abuse state resources in 
authoritarian regimes, with attention to how clientelism and rent-seeking undergird party 
cohesion. It will show how clientelist parties usurp the functions of the state and use their 
power over the levers of the state to control the larger society. In total, the literature review 
will show how the partisan distribution of state goods through clientelism is fundamental to 
maintaining competitive authoritarian regimes.  
 This thesis will use Mexico and Turkey as case studies on how clientelist parties 
function and their effect upon political regimes. It will review housing policies in Mexico 
and Turkey to understand how clientelist parties have used this critical need to exert control 
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over society. It will explore first how informal housing development and clientelism are tied. 
It will examine, the historical circumstances that gave rise to informal housing, and how this 
strengthened clientelist practices in Mexico City and Istanbul. It will then turn to how 
clientelist practices have evolved under different macroeconomic conditions. It will recount 
how these informal relationships of clientelism have endured even as the economic and 
political conditions that gave rise to it have changed, showing that clientelist parties can 
adapt even to dramatic changes to the economic system. Then it will show that clientelist 
practices remain an essential feature of the political systems of Mexico and Turkey. It will 
summarize recent changes to housing policy and will review how control of state housing 
subsidies and the housing formalization process is essential to understanding the political 
regimes in Mexico and Turkey.  
 Examining the mechanics of the massive housing programs introduced by the central 
governments, and their implementation illustrates the importance of partisan control of state 
resources. It will show that title formalization, and housing subsidies can be tools for 
clientelist manipulation of state power. The extent that this process is independently 
managed by the state bureaucracy for the benefit of citizens regardless of party affiliation or 
used for partisan ends to win elections is an indicator of the prevalence of informal practices 
detrimental to democracy. The case studies show the differences in how housing subsidies 
aimed at ending informal housing have been used in the two countries and the importance of 
the independence of the state bureaucracy from clientelist party control.  
This thesis argues that clientelist parties' ability to control housing subsidies has had 
significant ramifications for the political trajectories of both Mexico and Turkey. In Mexico, 
 7 
the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) lost the 2000 presidential election to the 
Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and the power of the state was divided between three parties. 
Despite the ubiquity of clientelism, a massive program of state housing subsidies introduced 
by the PAN party flowed through a federal agency that remained independent of partisan 
manipulation. This strengthened electoral contestation and the creation of different policy 
programs amongst the parties. In Turkey meanwhile, following the election of the Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) in 2002, its program of housing subsidies and title formalization 
were distributed on a partisan basis by a federal agency that was increasingly subsumed by 
the AKP. It proved a decisive way for them to win elections and consolidate their power and 
control over society. In Mexico, a single party's ability to use clientelist networks to control 
state resources broke down, while in Turkey, a single party used clientelist networks to gain 
control of state resources. A comparison of housing programs shows how the state has 
become more independent from parties in Mexico; where as in Turkey the ruling party has 
consolidated their control of the functions of the state. These changes have contributed to a 
reduced level of control of society in Mexico and increased partisan ability to coerce citizens 
in Turkey.  
 
 8 
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The literature shows informal institutions such as clientelism, help determine if a 
regime is democratic, authoritarian, or something else. Clientelism is a way of mobilizing 
collective action and is built on informal relations. It relies on the particularistic distribution 
of state goods based upon individual loyalty and not other independent criteria. Scholars 
debate the extent that is inherently undemocratic or if it can act as a source citizen 
empowerment. The literature shows, it is adaptive in that it can exist in a variety of contexts, 
including democratic and authoritarian regimes and rural and urban settings. It relies on 
inequality and benefits those who can capture the resources of the state. In the context of 
contested elections, it presents a direct challenge to citizen participation in collective 
decision-making.  
 The ability parties to use informal mechanisms for social control is a way for them to 
extend their reach into society and use the state to gain power. The literature shows how the 
abuse of state resources in combination with electoral politics creates a regime that is neither 
fully authoritarian nor fully democratic. The presence of clientelist networks alone does not 
make a regime authoritarian. However, the abuse of state resources in regimes with elections 
can be so unfair that the regime cannot be considered democratic despite the presence of 
democratic institutions. Clientelist networks abilities to distribute the resources of the state 
are vital to parties. The literature shows how rent-seeking and not ideology is the primary 
motivating factor for clientelist parties. These parties rely on the long-term distribution of 
state goods to create a "sunk" investment in the party and its continued control of the state. 
It this way, clientelist parties work against democratic control of the state. 
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Clientelism 
 Clientelism is a mechanism leaders use to gain the support of society. In Linkages 
between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities, Herbert Kitschelt examines how 
governments connect to the governed in democratic regimes. He separates these linkages into 
charismatic, policy, and clientelist types. These types address how politicians enable 
collective action to solve problems. In order to accomplish their goals, politicians band 
together in parties and invest in them as an organization. Kitschelt defines parties as 
"collective vehicles that solve problems of collective action and of collective choice" 
(Kitschelt, 2000, p. 848). These linkage mechanisms are present to varying degrees in both 
democratic and authoritarian systems. How they function is a contentious subject of 
discussion in the literature.  
 According to Kitschelt, the charismatic type of linkage relies upon the persuasive 
powers of a leader. He can create links to followers directly. They tend not to address a 
coherent program of action and to invest little in the organization of the party to resolve 
problems. Instead, the politicians of this sort tend to reserve discretion over decision-making 
and hold the party together through personal skill and persuasive power. This type of link 
between elites and the masses is common in authoritarian regimes but historically has rarely 
proven important in established democracies.  
 Programmatic political parties rely on the policy linkage type. It is accomplished 
through the universalistic distribution of collective goods based on established criteria, 
regardless of support, and based upon a codified program. According to Kitschelt, political 
parties looking to gain support based on programmatic linkages offer packages of policies 
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that they promise to pursue if elected into office. In such cases, parties must work out policy 
details and underlying principles and, in that process, make substantial investments in 
procedures of internal conflict resolution about programmatic disagreements and 
organizational infrastructure. The policy linkage has become commonplace in established 
democracies, and it relies almost exclusively on formal relationships. Kitschelt makes it clear 
that programmatic parties are the most visible form of linkage in democracies, but it is not 
the only form.  
 An alternative linkage method is the informal relationship of clientelism. According 
to Kitschelt, politicians create clientelist linkages when they invest in problem-solving 
techniques but not in forming a policy program. Instead, clientelism is the particularistic 
distribution of state resources, where political support is the main criteria. Clientelist linkages 
have proven flexible existing in established democracies and authoritarian regimes alike. The 
ethnically segmented big-city political machines that predominated in the early late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century in the United States, such as Tammany Hall in New 
York City, are examples of clientelist linkages. 
 The formality or informality of the exchange of state resources is an essential 
difference between programmatic and clientelist linkages. Informality is an open set of 
practices between partners with flexible roles. Clientelism is inherently informal; the 
procedural nature of exchange separates clientelist from programmatic linkages. Radnitz 
(2011) makes the case that formal relations always also involve some set of informal practices 
to make them function. The two work in tandem with informal arrangements filling in gaps 
created by formal institutions. From this vantage point, state and society relations cannot be 
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wholly formalized, and informal interactions affect the formal institutions. Clientelism is a 
prime example: clientelist linkages are an informal response to the formal institutions of 
elections and parties. Through the particularistic distribution of state resources, leaders gain 
the support of the party without investing procedures outside of the transaction. 
 In the system of clientelism, state power becomes primarily about controlling and 
distributing resources to supporters. Connections exist directly between patrons and clients. 
Such systems depend on high levels of inequality. Rent-seeking, broadly defined as the taking 
wealth without creating new wealth, especially through the privileged use of state power, is 
an essential component of clientelism. Clientelist parties gain support by combining the 
interests of rent-seeking elites and voters in economic need. Because the distribution of state 
resources is not contingent upon broad-based policy goals, but instead on exchange for 
support, there is less need to invest in party procedures to mediate programmatic 
disagreements. That said clientelist relationships require extensive investments in 
administrative infrastructure to distribute resources.  
 Other scholars offer similar definitions of clientelism that agree on transactional 
characteristics of clientelism but debate the importance of personal connections in the 
exchange and the benefits accrued to the client. For Stokes, in a clientelist system "party-
voter linkages are based on exchange—namely the distribution of selective benefits to 
individual voters or groups of voters in exchange for their votes" (Marschall, Aydogan, Bulut, 
2015, p.7). Here clientelism is an electoral mobilization strategy where material goods secure 
electoral support.  
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Other definitions emphasize the personal relationships of clientelism. Hilgers presses 
for a narrow definition that illustrates the complex nature of the phenomenon. She draws on 
Roniger's work to differentiate clientelism from vote-buying or patronage. By his definition, 
clientelism is the face-to-face exchange of goods and services between two people of unequal 
status. It involves norms of obligation and reciprocity and plays out over time across several 
interactions. It is to mutual benefit, durable, and depends upon benefits accruing to both 
parties. The definition contains a significant tension. It implicitly involves coercion because 
of the unequal power status of the entrants. The weaker party is always vulnerable and enters 
the relationship only because of their weakness, and the higher status member can always get 
the better end of the bargain. However, there has to be some benefit to the weaker party for 
the relationship to be maintained. Hilgers emphasizes that clientelism relies on the social 
framework of mutual obligation, which comes from traditional landlord-peasant links. As 
migrants have filled cities and taken on new urban identities, the practice has mutated into 
different forms; still, it retains a component of informal mutual commitment. In her 
estimation, personal and emotional attachments keep clientelism from only being a rational, 
interest-maximizing exchange.  
Other scholars show it is too narrow to think of clientelism only as a vestige of rural 
tradition; to them, this view explains only one type of clientelism. Because informal relations 
are an enduring and necessary trait of any system, clientelist links are best understood not 
only as traditional but also as a fully modern form of political relationships. Radnitz 
confronts the presumption that modernization leads inextricably to the formalization of 
relations and that clientelism is only a vestige of agricultural institutions. In his review of 
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recent scholarship on informal relations, Radnitz states clientelist networks need not be based 
upon shared identity, longstanding ties, and repeated interaction instead, "rent-seeking or 
clientelistic networks can be constructed on the basis of minimal common background or 
even created from scratch as long as actors share the same goal" (Radnitz, 2011, p.358). 
Therefore, clientelist relationships can be fluid, and minimal, so long as there are 
particularistic goods to cement the relationships. Kitschelt writes, "clientelism based on face-
to-face relations with normative bonds of deference and loyalty between patron and client 
represents one end of the continuum of informal political exchanges without legal 
codification" (Kitschelt, 2000, p.5). At the same time, he clarifies that it can also be modern 
and impersonal typified by "anonymous machine politics and competition between providers 
of selective incentives" (Kitschelt, 2000, p.5). In other words, clientelism does not need to 
rely on established relationships of the village or the tribe.  
 Therefore, it is imperative to view clientelism as an adaptive phenomenon that 
mutates in different contexts. For example, Jonathan Fox, in his 1994 article, The Difficult 
Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico, differentiates between types of 
clientelism. Importantly he distinguishes authoritarian clientelism and democratic 
clientelism. For him, the key to authoritarian clientelism is that it combines both the 
distribution of state goods but also repression. In what he defines as classic authoritarian 
clientelism, the patron must know individually how the client votes and be able to punish 
them if they do not follow through as promised. Fox also adds a definition of what he calls 
modern semi-clientelism. Its significant attributes are that it emanates from far-reaching 
social programs and relies less on politicians and their networks than the state bureaucracy. 
 14 
In his research state resources were distributed in contested electoral districts to gain votes for 
the party. However, partisan state bureaucrats mostly controlled the distribution of goods, 
not traditional clientelist bosses. They lacked the connection to local communities to 
individually repress those who accepted state benefits and then voted for the opposition. In 
this situation, state goods offered strong incentives, but there were fewer mechanisms for 
repression. Fox shows that this still falls short of fully programmatic distribution of benefits 
and autonomous social groupings consistent with democracy even while it worked against 
the more harsh repression of traditional authoritarian clientelism. Fox’s types of clientelism 
share the common trait of exchanging of access to goods or services to specific individuals for 
personal loyalty—something political parties have proven adept at delivering.  
 At the same time, it is important to not view clientelism solely in a normative 
manner, but also to understand the benefits it offers to its recipients. Hilgers believes there is 
an element of accountability in that clientelism results from competition between activist 
organizations. In order to receive support, patrons must deliver services to clients. She cites 
Günes-Ayata's (1994) argument that modernization and democratization atomize 
individuals rendering them powerless to obtain the resources they need. Clientelism provides 
access to market resources and community. It is crucial in organizing marginalized members 
of the urban fabric, mainly recent migrants and squatters, those who illegally occupy unused 
land. Poor individuals are easy to ignore and only through mobilization in groups are they 
able to effectively make demands. Leaders step in as brokers between the poor and the state 
and receive political support in return. Hilgers is therefore adamant that there is an 
interaction of not only power but trust and community, and that clientelism in rapidly 
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urbanizing areas is fundamentally different from rural structures and that it can be a source 
of community building (Hilgers, 2008).  
 In the end, for this thesis, it is most crucial to recognize that clientelist linkages 
function differently than programmatic linkages. Importantly, clientelism undermines 
democratic norms within the political parties themselves and perpetuates authoritarian 
practices. By corrupting the political sphere, it turns politics into a vehicle for the benefit of 
the few at the expense of the many. Clientelism makes the provisions of the state, guaranteed 
to all as benefits of citizenship, dependent upon supporting the party in power. Thus, it " 
controls citizens’ interests by trading political submission for resources that are provided 
discretionally although they are legally available to all" (Hilgers, 2005, p.3). Furthermore, 
"when clientelistic politics becomes the norm, non-policy selective benefits replace policy-
based collective benefits, which in turn insulates policymakers from the priorities of the 
general public" (Marschall et al., 2015, p.7). This is particularly noteworthy in the context of 
housing policies where clientelism relies on the privation of a basic need for shelter to 
function. It helps explain the creation of substandard housing that proved so deadly during 
earthquakes in Turkey and Mexico. Generally, clientelism "inhibits political freedom and 
participation while perpetuating economic inequality" (Hilgers, 2008, p.126). In an 
authoritarian regime, the informal bonds of clientelism may provide a defense against the 
whims of the government and add more accountability; in an electoral democracy it 
represents a direct challenge to citizen participation in collective decision-making and 
democratic control of the state. 
Regime Types 
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 It will be useful first to revisit the definitions of democracy and authoritarian 
governments. Much like clientelism, there is a substantial literature and with it a substantial 
debate on what constitutes democracy and what is authoritarian. In order to examine 
clientelist parties' control of state resources role in democratization in Mexico and Turkey is 
necessary first to define what democracy and authoritarianism are. The literature on 
clientelism above makes clear the presence of clientelism alone does not make a regime 
authoritarian (or democratic); it is merely one type of linkage mechanism which exists in a 
broader set of institutional arrangements. However, it does work against programmatic links 
common in industrial democracies. In that light, it is worthwhile to examine the institutional 
arrangements of different regime types and how they interact in combination with clientelist 
linkages. The purpose of exploring is not to be normative or prescriptive but to understand 
how the different types of regimes function. The literature below recounts the key 
institutional arrangements and practices of a democracy and what sets authoritarian regimes 
apart. Recent literature has also introduced the concept of the hybrid regime in which the 
use of state resources to create a skewed playing field, even where consequential elections 
determine who holds power. This type of regime is particularly relevant to Turkey and 
Mexico.  
 Authoritarian regimes are difficult to define because there is considerable variation in 
their institutional makeup. At the most basic, authoritarian governments are those that are 
not democratic. Levitsky and Way's definition is the most relevant for this paper. They 
define it as "a regime in which no viable channels exist for opposition to contest legally for 
executive power" (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.6-7). In terms of elections, they are non-
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competitive when regimes use repression or fraud such that there is no relationship between 
voter preference and official results. They state that elections are a façade if the executive 
receives more than 70% of the vote. These elections still play a vital role in authoritarian 
regimes. In Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule, Beatriz Magaloni 
explains that in authoritarian regimes, multi-party elections are vital to increasing the 
bargaining power of the ruling coalition against the dictator. They give a viable option to 
leave the ruling coalition and a peaceful avenue for other elites to challenge the dictator. 
Interestingly, "non-competitive electoral institutions may one day become competitive (as 
occurred in Mexico)" (Levitsky and Way, 2002, p.54). Generally, however, in authoritarian 
systems, election results are never in doubt and are not a meaningful channel to contest 
power. 
 On the other hand, democracy requires more than meaningful elections. Electoral 
based definitions of democracy ignore important questions of power and control. Ulusoy 
(2014) asserts a weakness in the literature "related to a shallow approach to democracy." He 
presses for a much deeper definition, stating "some essential components of a true process of 
democratization such as the recognition of ethnic/religious identities, autonomous 
representation of economic interests and other forces of civil society, and restructuring of the 
state in a way that would respond to the needs of democratic political regime, has generally 
been left out of the analysis framework" (Ulusoy, 2014, p.198). In short, he is highlighting 
the importance of individual and organizational autonomy and accountability to them in 
democratic regimes. Schmitter and Karl offer a definition of democracy that directly 
addresses the idea of accountability to citizens. They state, "modern political democracy is a 
 18 
system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public 
realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected 
representatives" (Schmitter and Karl 1991, p.2). Dahl writes democracy is a "political 
system, one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost 
completely responsive to all its citizens" (1972, p.2). Levitsky and Way define democracy 
procedurally following Dahl. It must have free and fair competitive elections and full adult 
suffrage. It requires the broad protection of Civil liberties, including freedom of speech, 
press, and association. Finally, there cannot be non-elected bodies that limit the ability of 
elected officials to govern. Levitsky and Way's definition carries with it criteria that make 
elections competitive and meaningful. They highlight that electoral turnover alone does not 
define democratic regimes. Together, these definitions underscore the importance not only 
of elections but also citizen control of the state in a democracy. 
 Levitsky and Way posit the creation of a third regime type, the hybrid authoritarian 
regime. Their 2010 book, Competitive Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War, focused on 
regime's that were not clearly democratic or authoritarian. Much of the earlier literature 
assumed that those regimes that were not definitively democratic or authoritarian were in 
transition. On the other hand, Levitsky and Way found some regimes have formal 
democratic elements but do not meet the criteria of democracies. Yet they were highly stable. 
These include regimes that deny suffrage to large segments of the population, or a ban a 
major party. They also include regimes where nonelected bodies have considerable power 
and constrain the power of elected officials. The authors emphasize that all of these regime 
types are distinct from full authoritarian regimes and democracy but also have meaningful 
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institutional differences from each other. In total, their work makes a strong empirical 
justification for the creation of this third type of regime where elections are meaningful but 
where citizens do not have full control over the state. 
 Levitsky and Way focus on a particular type of hybrid regime, which they classify as a 
competitive authoritarian regime. These regimes must have some democratic institutions, 
including elections, but they are not entirely free or fair. They define competitive 
authoritarianism in the following way: they are a civilian regime in which formal democratic 
institutions exist and "are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power" but in 
which "incumbent abuse of the state violates at least one of three defining attributes of 
democracy 1) free elections 2) broad protection of civil liberties, and 3) a reasonably level 
playing field" (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.7). Therefore, elections are critical in determining 
this regime type. Levitsky and Way differentiate competitive authoritarian from other 
authoritarian regimes by not only if elections exist but also if they are a in a meaningful 
contest for power. In competitive authoritarian regimes the elections, while filled with abuses 
of power, determine the executive and must be taken seriously. They are different from full 
authoritarian regimes in that elections are unfair in a variety of ways including repression and 
fraud but not so widespread as to render the election meaningless. Competitive authoritarian 
regimes are different from full authoritarian regimes in that opposition parties can campaign 
in the open without repressions such as the threat of exile or imprisonment and 
constitutional measures exist for the opposition to gain executive power. Nonetheless, by 
their definition, elections can be so unfair as to make a regime undemocratic.  
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 A significant aspect of Levitsky and Way's work is what differentiates democracies 
from competitive authoritarian regimes are informal institutions. The authors state: "one 
characteristic of competitive authoritarianism is the centrality of informal institutions" 
(Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.27). They recognize that informal institutions exist in all 
regimes. However, "given the disjuncture between formal (i.e., democratic) rules and actual 
behavior that is inherent to competitive authoritarianism, their role in such regimes may be 
particularly important (Levitsky and Way, 2008, p.27). What is fascinating is that this 
regime type allows the formal institutions to remain constant even while informal 
institutions can entirely change the nature of the regime. Informal institutions aimed at 
exploiting the state are at the heart of Levitsky and Way's. For this thesis, it is foremost to 
emphasize the contradiction that in competitive authoritarian regimes the formal institutions 
are democratic, but informal practices keep them from functioning as such. 
 Radnitz and the scholars he reviews also show that informal practices have substantial 
ramifications for the state. A key theme of his review is informal political relationships' 
ability to "weaken, substitute for, or work in parallel with, the state" (Radnitz, 2011, p.352). 
This conclusion is particularly salient if rent-seeking is the fundamental objective of 
government and source of resources for clientelism. Radnitz chillingly explains, "even an 
ostensibly strong and capable state can be undermined by, or become dependent on, 
informal networks if the state inadvertently provides incentives for collective action on an 
informal basis" (Radnitz, 2011, p.359). Clientelist parties can make the state depend on 
them to function. Instead of a unitary force, where clientelist relationships are the norm, the 
state can be made subservient to the party. Where informal relationships such as clientelism 
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predominate, individual actors carve up the state and its resources. Radnitz draws three 
conclusions. First, that ties can be minimal and quickly constructed so long as actors are all 
motivated by rent-seeking. Second, informal institutions can operate in both stability and 
transition. Third, if actors incentivize informal actions, they undermine the state. 
 While the rule of law and the media are weighty in Levitsky and Way's argument, 
the most relevant aspect of their work for this paper is the use of state resources to capture 
elections. The concept of a level playing field relates to the distribution of state resources; it 
hinges upon the privileged use of government controlled material goods by the incumbent 
party. In a democracy, electoral contests decide the mostly programmatic distribution of 
benefits, through the rule of law. As cited earlier Kitschelt, Levitsky and Way accept there is 
an incumbent advantage and some degree of clientelism or patronage in many established 
democracies. Levitsky and Way add a crucial qualifier: incumbent advantages cannot 
seriously undermine the opposition's ability to compete. They set a high stand for what 
makes competition unfair. They state "we consider the playing field uneven when (1) state 
institutions are widely abused for partisan ends, (2) incumbents are systematically favored at 
the expense of the opposition, and (3) the opposition's ability to organize and compete in 
elections is seriously handicapped" (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.10). Thus, the area that 
differentiates competitive authoritarian regimes from democracies is the way "in which 
incumbents abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage" (Levitsky and Way, 
2010, p.5). They write, "when incumbent manipulation of state institutions and resources is 
so excessive and one-sided that it seriously limits political competition, it is incompatible 
with democracy" (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.6). Exclusive access to state resources or 
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monopoly privileges allows private sector actors to amass wealth that they then channel back 
into the party. Thus, the particularistic distribution of benefits through clientelism plays a 
decisive role in competitive authoritarian regimes. Therefore a defining feature of a 
competitive authoritarian regime is the partisan use of public resources negates citizen 
control of the state necessary for a democracy. 
 Levitsky and Way found the organizational strength of states and their ruling parties 
was a determining factor in if a competitive authoritarian regime remained in place and what 
came after it. They believe authoritarian incumbents' ability to stay in power hinges their 
organizational power in short "the scope and cohesion of state and governing-party 
structures" (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.23). Parties are so fundamental to creating 
organizational capacity that Levitsky and Way found them decisive in maintaining 
competitive authoritarian regimes. If the party and state organizational capacities were strong 
incumbents held power. Even when the regime transitioned, if there were few links to 
western institutions, then strong parties contributed to authoritarian consolidation.  
 Other authors have also found that the organizational strength of parties is key to 
regime stability. Barbara Geddes, in What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty 
Years?, classifies authoritarian regimes by type in order to explain the varying durability of 
these regimes. She finds single-party regimes last longer, and Geddes identifies the 
institutional structure of single-party regimes explicitly as a central component to a regime's 
longevity. In The Politics of Authoritarian Rule Milan W. Svolik shows how political parties 
are vital to stability in authoritarian regimes. Svolik also shows organizational strength key in 
determining regime stability and sites the cost of maintaining a party as the main reason all 
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authoritarian regimes do not create a political party. In contrast to Geddes, he concludes, 
"what appears to be key to the survival of authoritarian ruling coalitions is the presence of 
the strong party, not necessarily a single one" (Svolik, 2012, p. 193). The literature clearly 
shows that the strong organizational capacities of parties are vital to regime stability.  
 However, there are different interpretations as to why parties are so useful to regime 
stability and how they accomplish the task of creating cohesion. Much of the scholarship 
looks to political parties' role coalescing elites. In Authoritarianism in an Age of 
Democratization Jason Brownlee asserts that political parties are substantive because of their 
role in mediating elite conflicts. Brownlee sees stability as a function of the party's ability to 
organize elite politics and regulate competing demands. Brownlee finds parties bind elites 
together and marginalize the opposition. This cohesion compounds the benefits for members 
belonging to the party in power. Magaloni asserts that the fundamental relationship of 
dictatorial regimes is between the dictator and his ruling coalition, and an essential 
institution for guaranteeing the deal is the political party. Magaloni emphasizes the 
permanent risk that dictators have of being deposed from within their own ranks by their 
own supporters. She says, "the dictator's dilemma can only be solved if the ruler generates 
incentives for members of the ruling coalition to vest their interest in the survival of the 
dictatorship, and this requires establishing some credible limits the dictatorial abuses" 
(Magaloni, 2008, p.720). In order to establish a credible power-sharing agreement, the 
dictator must give up some control "to a parallel political organization such as a political 
party" (Magaloni, 2008, p.716). In this way, political parties serve to solve the commitment 
problem between dictators and their coalitions. Both Brownlee and Magaloni believe parties 
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mediate elites to have a longer-term view, which facilitates coordination. Therefore, political 
parties play an essential part in mediating elite conflict and preventing elite defections to the 
opposition and thus promote regime stability.  
 Other scholars also look at political parties' vital role in uniting elites to the masses. 
In Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats, Jennifer Gandhi and Adam 
Przeworski look at how authoritarian leaders build coalitions that promote regime survival. 
In their view, they find repression alone is not explanation enough of regime durability; 
instead, leaders need cooperation from the masses. They gain this cooperation by using 
institutions to form linkages with the larger society. The absence of mass support boosts 
political opponents' chances to gain power by forming a rival political organization. Levitsky 
and Way show parties are how authoritarian regimes in mobilize people and retain power. So 
long as parties maintain mass support elite defections mean little. Accordingly, it is beneficial 
for party-based dictatorships to mobilize citizens, especially where there are multiple political 
parties. In Magaloni's view, the primary mechanism of mobilization is through the 
distribution of state goods. Political parties are the vehicles through which elites form links 
with and mobilize mass support.  
 Parties can maintain themselves through programmatic or clientelistic linkages 
between elites and the masses. As described earlier, these types of linkages can exist in both 
authoritarian and democratic regimes, but change how parties function. Programmatic 
parties are inherently ideological. Policy outcomes serve ideological goals. Therefore 
programmatic parties must work to work to establish policy and democratically resolve 
disagreements. On the other hand, the function of clientelist parties is to distribute goods in 
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a particularistic fashion and invest in structures to distribute goods. Spoils achieve party 
cohesion differently than policy concessions and ideology. The means parties use to create 
mass linkages reflects on the fundamental goal and operations of the party.  
 One of the central debates in the literature is the importance ideology as opposed to 
resource transfers in how to parties maintain cohesiveness and gain allegiance. Levitsky and 
Way find that patronage is not enough to create a stable party. They find a shared ethnic, 
ideological, or ties of shared struggle are noteworthy sources of cohesion. Similarly, Gandhi 
and Przeworski assert that "on-the-spot" resource transfers are not enough to build a durable 
regime. Brownlee too argues against looking at regime duration as only a function of material 
benefits mostly because the scholarship on clientelism minimizes the ways that parties create 
power and set an agenda that goes beyond material distribution. He says, "the coalition-
maintaining aspect of ruling parties, rather than their operation as patronage networks, 
explain elite cohesion within the regime and electoral control at the polls" (Brownlee 2007, 
p.215). Magaloni believes ideology is rarely the primary motivating factor in coalescing 
authoritarian regimes. She identifies rent-seeking as the primary motivation for all 
dictatorships, regardless of type or ideology. She says, "in my account, all dictators are 
presumed to be motivated by the same goal–survive in office while maximizing rents" 
(Magaloni, 2008, p. 717). Levitsky and Way also assume that the goal of incumbents is to 
retain power. Svolik shows the role of ideology in lessening costs of cooptation and recruiting 
party adherents. It is easier for a party to recruit members with similar ideologies or little 
ideological motivation. Magaloni offers a fascinating insight in this respect: for her, the most 
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pertinent aspect of ideology is that strong and highly polarized opponents make it harder to 
consolidate stable party dictatorships—a problem she sees most often solved through purges. 
 In authoritarian regimes parties function to provide a following for the dictator and 
are the organ through which they control the state. Gandhi and Przeworski write that for 
dictators "to rule the country, to supervise the state bureaucracy, they must rely on a political 
party" (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007, p.1283). Domination of the state bureaucracy by the 
party allows it to gain control over resources to use to co-optation the larger society. 
Magaloni shows how parties can use the control of the state to create a following. She states, 
"by making the distribution of benefits–subsidies, cash transfers, public goods, irrigation 
projects, housing, health services, and the like–contingent on citizens support, the dictator is 
able to induce loyalty" (Magaloni, 2008, p. 729). Levitsky and Way, identify institutional 
corruption as a way to bind elite actors to incumbent parties. In this way, parties are key for 
rent-seeking elites to dominate the state and society. 
 Many scholars find it is the temporal and conditional distribution of benefits, which 
is crucial to party and regime stability. Magaloni's scholarship shows how political parties 
work to distribute rewards to supporters over time, thereby solving the commitment problem 
between the dictator and his supporters. She explains how the distribution of rents binds the 
masses to the party: "citizens will remain loyal to the dictator in part because of the benefits 
they received and in part because of the fear of being expelled from the party's spoils system" 
(Magaloni, 2008, p.729). Magaloni asserts that the long-term distribution of rents is the 
primary function of authoritarian parties. By delegating authority to the parties, the "the 
dictator can more credibly guarantee to share power and the spoils of office over the long run 
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to those who invest in existing institutions rather than subversive coalitions" (Magaloni, 
2008, p.716). Svolik concludes that the political party's ability to extract costly service from 
party members in exchange for future rents is why parties are so effective at gaining long-
term allegiance from party members. He explains, "what makes co-optation via a party so 
effective is not the distribution of benefits itself—those could be easily distributed without a 
party. Rather, it is the conditioning of those benefits, prior costly service" (Svolik, 2012, 
p.164). This conditioning of benefits on service adds a long-term time horizon in which 
party members must invest in the maintenance of the party and regime. Magaloni shows 
potential rivals in autocratic institutions will remain loyal so long as the value of remaining 
loyal is larger than the payoffs for conspiracy. For these reasons, the clientelist linkages in 
authoritarian regimes are much more than "on the spot" transfers but instead are made up of 
a set of informal obligations that mean party members benefit only if the regime is 
maintained. These internal incentive structures induce the service that maintains the party's 
organizational strength. The institutional architecture of the ruling coalition rests upon 
clientelist linkages through political parties that condition loyalty and provides regime 
stability. Svolik and Magaloni show the institutional mechanism that makes party-based 
regimes more durable is the temporal distribution of benefits based upon costly service to the 
party. The work shows that the distribution of rents over time is particularly significant in 
why parties help authoritarian regimes survive.  
 The temporal distribution of benefits depends on the ability of the party to control 
political positions and that its members expect it to survive. Svolik identifies how parties use 
state power to gain influence. He writes, "policies established state control over a wide range 
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of careers—ranging from outright expropriation of key industries to heavy regulation" 
(2012, p.182). Thus, party-based service facilitates control over all major organized sectors of 
the state and society. Control of the state allows party elites to co-opt citizens by offering 
access to state resources or to repress opponents by denying these benefits. It allows the party 
to exert extensive political control over society. The benefits for party members are many, 
including employment, prospects for promotion, and educational opportunities. Barbara 
Geddes finds that regime stability rests on its "control over the allocation of educational 
opportunities, jobs, and positions in government" (Geddes, 1999). Gandhi and Przeworski 
write, "the party offers individuals willing to collaborate with the regime a vehicle for 
advancing their careers within a stable system of patronage" (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007, 
p.1283). The hierarchical nature of parties and the delayed rewards to party members take 
advantage of natural career aspirations to co-op the most productive and ideologically 
agreeable segments of the population. Through this control, they can gain the adherence of 
the most talented members of society and in particular those from marginal urban 
backgrounds who otherwise would have few prospects for upward mobility. The system is 
flexible and can operate in times of both economic growth and contraction. When better job 
prospects are available outside the party, it is obliged to loosen constraints on party members; 
however, when they are weak, they can require more stringent party membership. It is 
effective at co-opting both the masses and the elites. Therefore, clientelist parties in 
authoritarian regimes rely on control of the state bureaucracy reward party membership. 
 Besides the temporal distribution of benefits, the hierarchical nature of clientelist 
parties in authoritarian regimes helps exert control over the state and society. According to 
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Svolik, the hierarchical assignment of service and benefits associated with clientelist parties' 
leads to a much more enduring stake in the regime's survival. There are different benefits 
associated with the levels of the party hierarchy. The party benefits from the immediate 
outcomes of members' service while delaying the benefits accrued to them. Magaloni 
highlights this is useful in co-opting a large number of weaker players "the rank-and-file and 
mid-level party officials–who expect to be able to progressively gain more powerful political 
positions" (Magaloni, 2008, p.724). The benefits to the regime include electoral 
mobilization, intimidation, and voter fraud in multiparty regimes. Svolik distinguishes not 
only the importance of exchange within the party but the sunken political investment by 
their members. For the system to work the share of the spoils should increase as time goes on 
to lower-level members. Higher members reap most of the benefits; while lower-ranking 
members put in the work to maintain the party's rule. That is, one of the advantages of 
institutional parties is that the investment in the party becomes "sunk" and nontransferable 
across political coalitions. So long as this is "the only game in town," it presents strong 
incentives to join the ruling party and remain loyal. Party members become captive to their 
own career success with a vested interest in regime stability. In all the hierarchical structure 
of parties and temporal distribution of benefits gained from holding power are crucial to 
regime stability.  
 Altogether this shows clientelist parties are a key component of authoritarian and 
competitive authoritarian regimes. Clientelist linkages build parties that are primarily 
motivated by rent-seeking and not ideology. As such, this type of organization is resource-
intensive and relies on access to rents obtained from controlling the state. By dominating 
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appointments to the positions within the state bureaucracy the party is able to co-opt the 
provision of state resources. The temporal distribution of benefits and hierarchical 
organization of the party prompts followers to invest in the long-term stability of the regime. 
In this way clientelist parties are able to use state resources to build strong parties. Thus, 
clientelism plays an essential role in maintaining authoritarian and competitive authoritarian 
regimes.
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CASE STUDIES  
 Mexico and Turkey are excellent examples of the concepts from the literature at 
work. They are two cases of hybrid regimes that are moving in different directions. 
Clientelist parties' ability to capture the state is a significant cause of this divergence. The 
next section of this thesis will first identify why Mexico and Turkey are representative cases 
of hybrid regimes. It will then recap this history of both countries to understand the creation 
of clientelist parties and informal housing. It will review their importance in securing land 
tenure for residents. Next, it will look at the period after 1982 to understand the disruption 
of the 20th century systems that occurred with a change to the economic system. It will 
highlight the formation of the regime and party apparatus in the 1990s, so to identify the 
movement toward democracy in both Mexico and Turkey. Finally, it will look at their 
divergent trajectories following the 2000 and 2002 elections, respectively, that monitors 
widely regarded as free and fair. It will focus on the housing policies enacted after those 
elections as a window on how the clientelist parties have controlled the functions and 
resources of the state. Both countries had high percentages of informal housing and have 
launched large housing programs. In Mexico, the state has become more independent and 
transparent, while in Turkey, the ruling party has made housing allocations increasingly 
opaque and linked to party loyalty. 
Case Selection 
 Mexico and Turkey are good cases for comparison of clientelist practices and their 
effect on political regimes. Because they are in different regions, there are noteworthy 
 32 
historic, geographic and cultural differences between Mexico and Turkey. One of the most 
important is the role of religion. Mexico is a predominantly Catholic Christian country, 
while Turkey is predominantly Sunni Muslim. Religion has played a considerable role in the 
populist rhetoric of different parties. However, as shown in the literature above, clientelism is 
fundamentally about capturing state power and exploiting rent-seeking opportunities and 
not ideology. Cultural issues were relevant in the case studies below mostly as a means to 
manipulate urban workers. Similarly, both Turkey and Mexico have strong links to the 
established industrial democracies. They share borders and enjoy strong trading relationships 
with the European Union and the United States, respectively. They are both members of the 
OECD. Turkey is a NATO member. They have similar links to other democratic nations. 
Links to the west did not play a leading role the different regime trajectories of the two cases. 
Therefore cultural and regional explanations are insufficient to explain the different regime 
trajectories. Their geographic and cultural distance highlights the importance of political and 
economic factors and not cultural differences in democratization in both countries. 
 While they are culturally and geographically distinct Mexico and Turkey have much 
in common that makes them good cases for comparison. They have notable political and 
economic similarities. These similarities include factors that contribute to clientelism such as 
a history of authoritarianism, state interventions in their economic systems, rapid 
urbanization, high levels of inequality, and large developments of informal housing. Mexico 
and Turkey's clientelist political structures evolved from authoritarian regimes early in the 
formation of their republics. They both took their modern republican forms in the 1920s. In 
both cases, regimes came to power in the aftermath of the violent creation of their respective 
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nation-states. Populist leaders mobilized urban workers as a primary base of support and 
used corporatist structures to manage social conflicts. In Mexico, the PRI used clientelist 
practices to cement its rule for most of the latter half of the twentieth century. In Turkey, 
after moving from a single-party system after World War II, the country held competitive 
elections, but ideological differentiation was often truncated by coups that kept a narrow 
political elite in power. In both cases elites retained control of the state and did not trust the 
masses with political power. 
 Clientelism has a long history in both Mexico and Turkey. It existed in colonial 
Mexico before independence, and it formed a part of the Ottoman political tradition were 
people regarded the state as a protector and the provider. Both Turkey and Mexico's political 
systems became dependent upon clientelist networks in the twentieth century reinforced by 
nationalist economic policies. Clientelism played an integral part in the process of 
urbanization and the incorporation of the masses into politics. Controlling tenure rights to 
informal housing has historically been crucial to clientelist control of the urban masses. In 
both situations, elections further entrenched clientelist practices. Thus, clientelist linkages to 
the masses became the norm in both Turkey and Mexico, making them excellent cases for a 
comparison of the outcomes of such informal practices. 
 Both Turkey and Mexico experienced an economic crisis in the early 1980s that 
upset the status quo. As a result both changed their primary economic system from Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) to neoliberalism in the period that followed. As predicted 
by the literature, the withdrawal of the state from the economy reduced resources available 
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for political manipulation. However, while the shift to neoliberalism changed the state and 
society it both countries, is has not necessarily not resulted in democratization. 
Both countries are also examples of hybrid regimes. Mexico was one Levitsky and 
Way's prime examples of competitive authoritarianism, where the regime has some 
democratic institutions, including elections, but they are not entirely free or fair, because of 
the PRI’s extensive use of state resources and outright fraud to sway elections. Levitsky and 
Way did not classify Turkey as a competitive authoritarian regime but they did consider it a 
hybrid regime. The unelected leaders of the military held a considerable control over the 
state until at least 2002. Furthermore, the military and ruling parties excluded Kurdish and 
religious parties from full participation in elections in Turkey through the 1990s. What is 
material for this paper is that both regimes held competitive elections, but fell short of full 
democracy. 
 By 2002 both Turkey and Mexico had democratic elections that were mostly free 
and fair. In the 2000 election in Mexico, new institutional arrangements allowed for 
independent oversight of elections and the PRI was peacefully removed from power. In the 
2002 election in Turkey, the historically Islamist AKP was allowed to participate, and 
Kurdish supporters were an essential part of the AKP electoral coalition. Over the next 
several years, the AKP systematically dismantled the military's control over the state. Thus 
the two countries had important democratic institutions; fairly contested and honestly 
counted elections with significant public participation. They both appeared on a clear path 
towards democracy if they were not considered democratic already. 
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However, as the literature above makes clear, democracy requires much more than 
elections. Elections must deliver the citizen accountability and control called for by 
Schmitter, Karl, and Dahl necessary for democracy. Instead, they both remain hybrid 
regimes. Despite the formal apparatus of competitive elections, the abuse of public resources 
to manipulate elections remains a significant issue in both Turkey and Mexico (Diaz-Cayeros 
and Magaloni, 2013; Aydin-Düzgit and Gürsoy, 2013; Ulusoy, 2014). Yet, since 2002, 
Mexico has become increasingly democratic, while Turkey has become more authoritarian. 
For this paper, what is significant is that both countries have formally democratic 
institutions, but the informal practices of clientelism shape the true nature of the regime. 
The formal constitutions of the two countries did not change between 1983 and 2016, the 
same formal political institutions remained in place, however, and radical changes in 
informal practices altered the nature of the Mexican and Turkish regimes. Above all, the 
divergent paths of Turkey and Mexico show the importance and tension between informal 
institutions of democracy and informal arrangements that can undermine it. 
 In Turkey and Mexico, clientelist parties' control of state resources, particularly 
access to housing, has allowed them to function in a variety of economic systems. Both 
countries relied on policies of Import Substitution Industrialization and permitted massive 
informal housing developments in the mid-twentieth century. They similarly transitioned to 
a neoliberal economic system near the turn of the century. The literature failed to predict 
how entrenched clientelist parties were and how they would adapt. Even amid the economic 
upheaval, clientelist parties retained their strength and remain a fundamental part of the 
political system despite the systemic economic change.  
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Since 2002 both countries have embarked upon massive housing programs to build a 
more formal housing market. These programs highlight important changes in the informal 
institutions. The following section reviews the history of urbanization and informal housing 
development in Mexico and Turkey and how it reinforced a clientelist political system. Next, 
it recounts the shift in economic policy and the efforts to create more formal markets in 
Mexico and Turkey. Clientelist parties' involvement in housing formalization is a venue to 
examine how the different trajectories of the political systems of Turkey and Mexico. The 
toleration of informal settlements is a component of the story. While there are similarities in 
the political history and economic policies of Mexico and Turkey, by the first decade of the 
twenty-first century there were significant differences in the extent to which clientelist parties 
in each country were able to monopolize the resources of the state.  
Clientelism and Urbanization 
 Both Mexico and Turkey took their present forms after a violent upheaval followed 
by a period of state formation in the 1920s. Modernization and urbanization began in the 
late 19th century. However, the inability of existing regimes to accommodate social changes 
led to their demise and upended the existing political and social structures of Turkey and 
Mexico. Industrialization accelerated rapidly in the twentieth century. Urbanization in 
Mexico and Turkey corresponded with the period of state-led economic development in the 
global economy. After the great depression, countries circumscribed the movement of people 
and goods across borders. Nation-states became much more self-contained, and the state 
took a more active role in the economy. Populist leaders and their parties implemented 
policies that led to mass urbanization and the concentration of industry near centers of 
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power. Both countries developed through state-led policies known as Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI). Mexico City and Istanbul were the centers of economic and 
population growth in Mexico and Turkey, respectively. Because of their size and economic 
power, these cities and their citizens became important nationally. Each grew to over 10 
million people ranking them among the largest cities in the world. They continue to be the 
political and economic locus of their countries.  
 Industrial development and nationalist economic policies of ISI reinforced clientelist 
linkages. Industries with close ties to the state became sources of patronage. While ISI drove 
overwhelming growth the principal cities, there were costs in the quality of housing for 
citizens. The new states were unable to provide adequate housing to the newly formed 
working classes. Clientelist linkages became the primary base of support for political parties, 
as the dearth of housing led neighborhood groups to organize for the provision of goods and 
services. As a result, political parties developed to be more transactional than policy focused. 
These linkages that took advantage of urbanization would prove difficult to dislodge. Thus, 
Mexico and Turkey's development gave rise to economic and political relationships that 
relied on using the resources of the state to gain political support. The following section will 
detail these conditions that gave rise to clientelist networks in Mexico and Turkey in the 
mid-twentieth century.  
 The leaders who emerged in the new republics were determined to continue the 
process of agrarian reform, urbanization, and industrialization that began in the first decades 
of the twentieth century. In Mexico, under the populist leadership of President Lazar 
Cárdenas, between 1934 and 1940 the Mexican state redistributed 20 million hectares of 
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land. This change and the mechanization of agriculture freed rural peasants from the debt 
bondage that tied them to plantation agriculture (Stern, 1982; Chasteen, 2016). These 
factors, combined with high birthrates and improvements in healthcare, increased the 
population and made the Mexican countryside the source of massive outmigration for the 
next century. Similarly, in Turkey, following World War II, the Marshall plan brought 53 
billion in aid from the United States. The government chose to focus these resources on 
mechanizing agriculture and industrializing the country in order to enter the world market 
through manufacturing and agriculture exports. Policies included direct state subsidies to 
industry and purchasing large numbers of tractors and other farm equipment. The result was 
millions of displaced rural workers flocking to the city in search of factory jobs (Öztürk and 
Çiraci, 2010). In short, the combination of political and technological changes led to rapid 
urbanization in both Turkey and Mexico. 
An essential aspect of Mexico's and Turkey's development was the economic policy 
of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). As summarized by Lomnitz (1977) and Stern 
(1982), practiced in Mexico and Turkey from roughly the 1940s until the early 1980s, it was 
an attempt to foster domestic consumption by putting high tariffs on imports from abroad 
in order to develop local industrial production. ISI, in effect, works as a subsidy for firms. It 
moves the costs of industrial development onto consumers through higher prices for goods. 
 In Import Substitution Industrialization economies, the state plays a chief role in 
decision-making. State involvement in the economy concentrated growth in areas near state 
power. Therefore, these policies concentrated urbanization in Mexico and Turkey towards 
major cities connected to the state. The population of Istanbul exploded from 1.5 million 
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people in 1950 to more than 11 million people in Istanbul proper and more than 16 million 
in the Istanbul metropolitan region by 2008 (OECD, 2008). Beginning with less than half a 
million people in 1900 and still only 1.5 million in 1940, Mexico City housed more than 
8.3 million in 1970. By 1970, the metropolitan area of Mexico City, with 17% of the 
population, concentrated close to 50% of the value of industrial production of the country. 
By 2008 the population of the Federal District of Mexico City had reached 8.8 million, and 
the Mexico City Metropolitan region counted more than 21 million people. As a result of 
state-led economic development and massive migration, Mexico City and Istanbul became 
loci of urbanization and industrialization (Stern, 1982; Lomnitz, 1977; Yalcintan and Erbas, 
2003; Baker, 2012). 
 As Turkey and Mexico pursued economic policies of Import Substitution 
Industrialization, the governments passed the costs of national development onto the 
citizens. State subsidies for industry concentrating industrial development in Mexico City 
and Istanbul put enormous strain on the usage demands of urban land and infrastructure. 
Under ISI state policies provided insufficient resources for housing to accommodate the 
recently arrived migrants. In response to the lack of housing, the governments tolerated the 
creation of massive informal settlements. This toleration allowed factories to keep wages low 
and fueled further growth. Thus in both Mexico and Turkey state policy favored 
manufacturing over formalizing property rights as national development policies trumped 
local development decision-making.  
 Mexico's government chose to allow informal settlements in the form of squatter 
settlements and shantytowns, as well as the illegal subdivision and sale of communally held 
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agricultural land. Private property rights and their abrogation by the revolutionary state are 
fundamental to the Mexican Constitution (Cueva, 1987). Land invasions and squatter 
settlements were one of the primary forms of access to land in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Eventually, the illegal subdivision of communally held agrarian lands became the principal 
source of land for informal development. These lands include tierras comunales, held by 
indigenous communities from "time immemorial," and ejidos. The state created ejidos as a 
way to turn landless peasants into small farmers after the revolution. In the 1930s under 
President Cardenas, it redistributed an enormous amount of Mexico's land for communal 
agriculture. He turned more than half of the land around Mexico City into ejidos. With the 
1973 Agrarian Reform act, the Mexican government established a process for the 
regularization of communal ejido lands. The 1973 act required the unilateral expropriation 
from the ejido by the president for it to become legally urban land. The process involved a 
dedicated agency to negotiate the process. Regularization went through a federal agency, the 
Commission for the Regularization of Land Tenure (CORETT), and followed agrarian laws. 
The law sets the level of compensation that communal ownership corporations will receive. 
Only once the process is complete is the "agricultural" nature of the land removed. However, 
it is a clearly defined process, and therefore provides a more secure form of tenure, even 
though only a small fraction of developments were ever formalized. The fact that there is a 
single agency  with considerable power within the corporatist machinery of the state 
responsible tenure arrangements made ejido land the preferred type of land for informal 
settlement in Mexico, which still accounts for the majority of housing production. The 
arrangements provided housing and reasonably secure tenure for millions of Mexicans but it 
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created a legal grey area of implicitly approved though not outwardly legal tenure (Varley 
2002). 
Informal housing also proliferated in Turkey during the mid-twentieth century. In 
1956, there were 31,914 illegal squatter houses in Istanbul. By 2002 there were an estimated 
1,250,000 illegal buildings and 575,000 shanty style houses (Öztürk and Çiraci 2010, p.5). 
Informal housing was so crucial to Istanbul's development that the government tolerated it. 
Self-built homes even developed a name, gecekondu, which refers to this tacit approval. The 
word means "one-night house" alluding to the to the initial arrangement whereby authorities 
ignored untitled buildings so long as they were built overnight. Additionally, the use of an 
informal development model known as the appurtenance system, in which small builders 
would assemble technically illegal joint ownership in small multi-unit buildings was so 
widespread that it "was adopted throughout the country within two or three decades as the 
dominant form of housing provision and mode of urban living" (Balamir, 1999, p.392). In 
the 1970s and 1980s through various amnesty laws, the government institutionalized an ad 
hoc system of de facto legalization of squatter and appurtenance housing.  
 Clientelism thrives during urbanization. There is an important reason; as illustrated 
in the literature review above, clientelism relies on unequal social relationships. Clientelist 
parties gain support by combining the interests of rent-seeking elites and voters in economic 
need. Such systems depend on high levels of inequality. Economist Simon Kuznets theorized 
that urbanization inherently leads to higher levels of inequality. His work showed that as 
people move from the countryside to the city, they at first lack skills and receive low wages. 
As a result, inequality jumps rapidly at the beginning of the process of industrialization and 
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urbanization. Therefore the process of urbanization creates conditions of inequality favorable 
to clientelism. 
 Informal settlements add to this inequality. The inherent illegality of informal 
settlements creates fertile ground for coercion. As a result, there is deep-rooted involvement 
of politicians, political parties in the informal settlements. These include sanctioning land 
invasions and protecting informal subdivisions. Such activities indicate that the 
implementation of policies and application of regulations in "land and housing are 
intrinsically tied to, and a result of, the interplay between different political and economic 
interest groups which is often manifested in the form of clientelism and political mediation" 
(Keivani and Werna, 2001). As a result, informal settlements are an essential base for 
clientelist political parties. 
 In both Mexico City and Istanbul, the result of policies tolerating informal housing 
was a citizenry with few formal tenure rights susceptible to clientelist coercion. Various 
scholars described Mexico City and Istanbul as nearly unmanageable mega-cities with 
massive informal developments composed of low-quality housing and few basic services. 
However, other scholars advise against normatively looking at housing only as a dual system 
in which formal housing as good and informal housing is bad. Whether it is formal or 
informal makes little difference in the quality of housing available to citizens (Varley, 2002). 
Self-built homes without title may have services and pay taxes, while those built by the 
formal sector may lack them (Herbert, Belsky and DuBroff, 2012). Instead, they point to the 
importance of security of tenure and not just formal land rights as the issue of principal 
importance for the urban poor (Payne, 2004). From this frame of reference, informal 
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housing with secure tenure can address the needs of many. Because informal settlements 
lacked formal titles and did not provided secure tenure, they left residents vulnerable to 
coercion. Informal settlements created a dense network of potential voters in need of state 
resources pliable to clientelist practices from powerful patrons who could provide tenure 
security and other urban services. 
 In Turkey and Mexico, clientelism rooted in informal housing settlements was the 
bedrock of populist political movements that shaped state and regime formation in both 
countries. Steve Stein, in his writing on populism, highlights the break down of the 
nineteenth-century political system in the face of "massification" as a result of urban growth. 
He posits populism harnessed new demands brought by middle and working classes and 
needs to be understood as primarily urban and conservative in that it mostly did not seek to 
disrupt the status quo. Populist leaders and policies played an important role in national 
integration and bringing the masses into the political fold, though in a dependent 
relationship. By using patronage and clientelism, populism directed the energies of the 
working and middle classes towards electing a charismatic leader in exchange for material 
goods. In general, new groups made political demands for more material benefits but were 
denied actual political incorporation through policymaking. Thus clientelist parties in both 
countries were an outgrowth of populist mobilization the urban masses without participation 
in decision-making. It maintained elite control and prevented the full political incorporation 
of the masses, leaving the decision making to party elites instead.  
 In Turkey, the residents of informal settlements increasingly saw politics as a vehicle 
involved in obtaining benefits for themselves, their families, and communities and not 
 44 
creating broad-based policies. Karpat (1976) found, for squatters, those who are illegally 
occupying land to which they have no claim, the need to defend their land motivated 
political activity. Formal associations established by squatter settlers functioned as liaisons 
between dwellers and political parties to conduct bargains with the city and national 
politicians. Leaders had to demonstrate the ability to defend the interests of the squatter 
settlement. In this context, politics became highly transactional (Ulusoy, 2014). Gecekondu 
residents were pragmatic voters who voted less on ideology and more on their own needs. 
Karpat says, "voting, therefore is a way of transforming the communal opinion into a 
political will and into a political vehicle for updating material benefits" (Karpat, 1976, 
p.205). Other scholars come to similar conclusions, "politics was understood and defined as 
a strategy to build and sustain power by distributing material benefits generated by the state 
through clientelist channels of interest mediation" (Marschall et al., 2015, p.14). The contest 
for votes of recently arrived migrants—and the electoral power that came with them—
between the established secular elites in both the Conservative and Social Democratic parties 
incentivized ad hoc legalization of informal settlements. The retroactive extension of 
ownership rights to the occupiers by granting illegal buildings amnesties helped cement the 
populist coalition between industrialists, secular political parties vying for loyalty and 
urbanites (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.5). Again, Karpat explains, the full impact this had on 
the political system: 
In the case of the Turkish Squatters, the demand making transformed the 
traditional and mythical devlet baba (father state), an aloof, authoritarian 
semi-deity, into a living government—into a human organization that could 
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be manipulated to do or undo certain acts, especially with regard to 
gecekondus. (Karpat, 1976, p.198)  
Thus, during the period of state-led economic development, clientelism and patronage 
became the norm for all political parties (Sayarı 2011). Clientelist networks were how the 
urban masses engaged in Turkish politics, during the era of ISI. 
 Similarly, the authoritarian government of PRI entrenched clientelism as the primary 
practice of politics. As posited by Hilgers earlier, individually, urban poor are easy to ignore 
and only through mobilization in groups are they able to effectively make demands. Leaders 
step in as brokers between the poor and the state and receive political support in return. For 
example, squatters who illegally claimed and occupied land without consent in the 1930s 
and 1940s, were subject to the threat of eviction and relied on the political protection of 
patrons. Moreover, the taking of land usually only applied to the first wave of settlers, all 
subsequent residents must pay those with de facto control. According to Cueva (1987), the 
PRI institutionalized the leadership of squatter settlements by creating "settlement 
improvement associations." An unwritten requirement was membership in PRI. Once the 
party established this organization, the authorities would hear demands for services and 
adhere to a tacit non-eviction pact. These leaders gained land-rent in exchange for providing 
protection. This arrangement "contributed to the disciplined incorporation of the new urban 
masses into the PRI" (Cueva, 1987, p.529). Similarly, the PRI was able to coopt the 
leadership of ejido settlements. The PRI kept the property rights of ejidatarios vague in order 
to permit it to intervene. Patrons, who were able to negotiate the corporatist machinery of 
the state, were key to maintaining housing tenure for those who occupied illegally subdivided 
 46 
agricultural lands. The control of communal lands involves a corporatist system of 
representation linked to agrarian authorities and the PRI. Cueva (1987) makes clear the ejido 
leadership did not protect peasants' interests but instead mostly obtained rents from the 
urban masses settled there. Thus PRI controlled clientelist networks became a central feature 
of informal settlements in Mexico. 
 In Mexico the expectation for settlement leaders was also to secure resources and 
protection and not democratization. Hellman explains, "the goals of old organizations were 
straightforward: to establish themselves as a force with which to be reckoned on the local 
and, eventually, the national scene, and thus to wrest concessions from the state" (Hellman, 
2008, p.67). Different corporatist groups within the party pledged loyalty to powerful party 
factions in exchange for rewards from the state-controlled by the PRI. Social movements 
were subsumed within the party through these structures and had little or no independence. 
Thus, contrary to Hilgers' assertion earlier that clientelism promotes organizing and 
accountability, Hellman (2008) emphasizes this is a highly effective form of social control. 
Opposition movements faced a devil's bargain between material concessions their supporters 
desperately needed or continued future independence and the ability to critique the regime. 
She explains, "independent, opposition organizations sow the seeds for change through years 
of determined struggle, while quiescent PRI-affiliated peasants or urban poor reap the 
rewards" (p.67). Thus the essential relationship between the government, political parties, 
and social movements in Mexico for more than a half-century was one of supplication 
through clientelism at the expense of independent parties and social movements essential to 
democracy.  
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 Thus, clientelist linkages to the masses through patronage became the norm in both 
Turkey and Mexico during ISI. The political parties in both Turkey and Mexico focused on 
the delivery of clientelist goods and the protection of land tenure but not programmatic 
policy solutions. There were elections but this system failed to create differentiated policy 
options and left little political power for the masses. Instead of promoting the organizing 
efforts of marginalized groups, clientelism coopted independent social organizations. 
Accountability of the state was subsumed by demands for subservience to receive public 
resources.  
Regime Change in Turkey and Mexico 
 The previous section outlined how clientelism became the predominant linkage 
strategy in Turkey and Mexico during their rapid industrialization. However, by the late 
1970s, the economic system of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) was no longer 
sustainable. Following political and economic crises, the policy of ISI was replaced by 
policies that reduced the role of the state in the economy. This change theoretically should 
reduce the number of patronage resources available to clientelist parties and change the 
political dynamics of the country. However, in both Turkey and Mexico, clientelist linkages 
proved difficult to dislodge. The section below will detail how the economic and political 
regimes in Turkey and Mexico transformed in the 1980s and 1990s but also how clientelism 
remained fundamental feature of politics and remained important in securing housing 
tenure. 
 Starting in the late 1970s, the structure of the global economy began to change 
radically. New information technologies expanded the reach of international commerce and 
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finance far beyond national borders. Changes in shipping and communications technology 
allowed corporations to become multinational. This shift went part and parcel with the 
opening of national economies and the expansion of global markets. State subsidies for 
industry and employment were expensive and became increasingly difficult to sustain, 
prompting debt and inflation. Globally, "state regulation and management, and the rapid 
expansion of government employment shifted from being part of the solution to be seen as 
part of the problem" (Soja, Morales and Wolff, 1983). Through policies known collectively 
as neoliberalism, national economies became much more open with fewer restrictions on the 
movement of goods, and capital between nations. In the end, the emphasis on industrial 
development was superseded by the importance of cultivating international investment, 
especially in finance, insurance, and real estate.  
 Ideologically, neoliberalism rests in part on modernization theory, which posits 
democratization is about economic development: once a country reaches a certain level of 
development, it will democratize. Large state sectors work against democratization because 
they slow development, support clientelism, and lead to authoritarianism. According to the 
tenets of neoliberalism, it is therefore imperative for democratization to increase international 
trade and reduce state intervention in the economy. In the literature on the third wave of 
democratization during the 1990’s, there is substantial evidence that lessening of materials 
resources of authoritarian regimes played a role in increasing the number of democratic 
regimes as patronage resources dried up. Levitsky and Way, find after the Cold War changes 
in the global economy and economic crisis led to a shrinking of patronage resources and a 
lessening of the coercive apparatus (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.17). Geddes, in her study of 
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democratization, found that the lessening of resources was instrumental in the fall of many 
patrimonial regimes. She writes that in the late 1980s, a series of economic crises and 
subsequent reforms forced on authoritarian regimes by international lenders slashed the 
resources available to distribute to the masses, especially in countries that practiced ISI which 
created disproportionately large state-controlled sectors of the economy. She writes this 
"reduced benefits to regime supporters at the same time that the crisis itself reduced 
acquiescence among ordinary citizens" (Geddes, 1999, p.139). The diminished resources 
available weakened the clientelist networks that supported many personalist and military 
regimes and "without these material inducements, allies and supporters deserted their 
leaders" (Geddes, 1999, p.139). Therefore, the expectation was that as countries reduced 
their state sectors it would diminish clientelism and aid in democratization.  
 However, there is also significant evidence that economic development alone will not 
lessen clientelism and encourage democratization. Levitsky and Way point out increased 
societal wealth and modernization were not factors in democratization in Latin America, 
Africa, or communist Eurasia. Geddes, and Gandhi and Przeworski also found single party 
regimes were resilient even when the state sectors shrank. Mexico and Turkey are pivotal 
cases in this argument because as G20 and OECD countries, they are now highly developed, 
but not fully democratic. The cases show that the change from ISI to neoliberalism did 
profoundly effect the formal political and economic institutions of Mexico and Turkey, but 
that informal institutions of clientelism in both countries proved adaptive and resilient. 
Economic instability led both Mexico and Turkey to abandon policies of ISI. 
Balance of payments deficits led Turkey to default on its debt in 1978; Mexico defaulted in 
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1982. Mexico and Turkey both had to deregulate their economies to conform to a neoliberal 
model and appease lenders. Financial reforms included: fiscal austerity, privatization of state-
owned companies, reductions in trade barriers, industrial deregulation, and foreign 
investment liberalization. The changes exposed companies that had formerly enjoyed tariff 
protection under the policy of Import Substitution Industrialization to completion on the 
global market (Rabobank, 2013).  
 Economic instability brought political instability and economic reform in Turkey. 
Parliamentary deadlock and violence resulted in a military coup in 1980 and the subsequent 
ban on political parties and imprisonment of several leaders. The modern era of Turkish 
politics begins with the restoration of civilian rule in 1983. The new electoral system was 
more majoritarian and instituted a much more stable and effective government (Ulusoy, 
2014). The new government moved definitively away from policies of ISI and planned the 
economic reforms carried out over the next two decades. Turgut Özal, as prime minister 
until 1989, instituted a series of neoliberal economic policies and reduced the role of the 
state by selling off remaining state-owned industrial firms. These changes aimed to stabilize 
the currency, diversify the economy, and open up Turkey to global investment. The 
government had embarked upon a process of political and economic liberalization. 
 Meanwhile, state-led economic expansion that had financed PRI rule in Mexico for 
decades was also faltering. Subsequently, the regime faced a crisis as its economic program of 
ISI, which provided the state resources for its clientelist networks, became untenable. In 
response, the PRI adopted neoliberal economic policies that reduced the role of the state in 
the economy. This lessoned the bundle available for clientelism. Under the government of 
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Miguel de la Madrid, the directive was to ignore or repress urban social movements 
completely. However, the 1985 earthquake made this approach untenable. Almost 
overnight, new social movements organized against the dismal response by the PRI and the 
failure of the state to deliver services to poor Mexicans. Housing, in particular, was a catalyst 
for action as the government evicted squatters from illegal settlements. The era of Import 
Substitution Industrialization was definitively over. 
 In response, the PRI began to splinter between Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of the 
former president, who favored a continued state-led economy and Carlos Salinas who 
championed privatizing state firms and other neoliberal economic reforms. Salinas emerged 
with the backing of the PRI as the designated successor to the presidency. Cárdenas led a 
coalition of leftists and reformers to challenge Salinas in the 1988 presidential election. 
However, massive fraud guaranteed the election of Salinas and continued PRI control. 
According to Levitsky and Way, this election was critical in that the decision to allow fraud 
in the 1988 election caused a regime crisis in Mexico. Salinas proceeded with neoliberal 
economic reforms now using the profits from privatizing state resources to provide 
clientelist-housing subsidies to the poor, however, the seeds of mass discontent were already 
sown (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni, 2013). 
 The 1990s witnessed significant increases in the number and power of political 
parties in both Turkey and Mexico. In the absence of flush patronage networks, traditional 
parties were not as effective at suppressing popular demands. Previously marginalized social 
movements were able to organize and advocate for more diverse representation. The new 
political parties formed and presented themselves as challengers to the status quo. By the end 
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of the decade, they were able to take control of the local governments in both Istanbul and 
Mexico City the largest and most important cities of each country landing a decisive blow to 
the old political elite.  
 The return to elections made the political system of Turkey democratic in the sense 
that it was more inclusive; in particular, it began the admittance and then ascent of Islamist 
parties in Turkey. Populist economic policies had brought instability and crisis. The Islamist 
parties, on the other hand, projected an image of competence and rectitude. The religious 
nature of the parties allowed them to present themselves as outsiders to traditional politics 
and wear a mantle of moral authority. Thus "introducing a universal Islamist morality, it 
developed a convincing message for the poor as the alternative to secular parties associated 
with corruption, conspicuous consumption and ideological ambiguity" (Ulusoy, 2014, 
p.193). At the same time, the country was in flux, "liberalizing the economy, modernizing 
infrastructure and expanding communication technology brought significant social 
transformation and deepened existing secular-religious divide" (Ulusoy, 2014, p.193). The 
Islamist parties stepped into this void with programs rooted in pro-business and social 
welfare policies. By campaigning against the perceived corruption of the traditional political 
establishment, while building clientelist networks of their own, the Islamist parties were well 
positioned to take advantage of the economic crisis and return of electoral democracy. 
 The previously banned Islamist movement became a political and social force. The 
Refah Partisi (RP), or Welfare Party, dominated local elections in 1994 and instituted a 
program built on the promise of capable governance. They pursued a pragmatic approach to 
Islamist objectives by concentrating on organizational efficiency and service delivery. Led by 
 53 
Istanbul mayor Recap Erdoğan, it was notably effective in responding to popular needs. 
Crucially, electoral victory in Istanbul meant the party had control of the local levers of the 
state in the most populous and economically important city in the country. Control of local 
government and its place political structures of the country would help shape the trajectory 
of the regime. 
 In Mexico, various civil society and political groups mobilized in opposition to the 
PRI. Cárdenas harnessed the anger of these diverse opposition movements and actors into a 
single party, the PRD in 1989, to oppose what he viewed as the illegitimate Salinas 
government. Throughout the 1990s the new social movements, the PRD, and other 
opposition parties mounted a sustained challenge to PRI. Civil society groups mobilized 
around making elections fair, while the PRD recruited patrons from the PRI to increase the 
new party’s power. The opposition was able to exact concessions including the establishment 
of an electoral commission in 1994 and resulting fair multi-party elections in 1997. In the 
first elections to locally govern Mexico City's Federal District since the revolution, the PRD 
took control, campaigning against neoliberal reforms. Elections became the institutional 
mediator in the inter-elite split. While the PRD focused on taking power, democratization 
was the clear goal of civil society groups outside of the political parties and their combined 
efforts were highly effective and would have important repercussions on the trajectory of the 
regime. 
 In Turkey, however, widespread popular anger led to the rejection of all existing 
political parties in the wake of the catastrophic 1999 earthquake and economic stagnation. In 
2001 Erdoğan led a pro-business, center-right faction of the Islamist movement in Turkey to 
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create the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) or Justice and Development Party. The AKP's 
organizing tactics and structure are rooted in its origins in the Milli Görüş or National 
Outlook Movement and the Milli Nizam Partisi or National Order Party founded in 1970. 
Like its predecessor, the party had its roots in squatter settlements and drew significant 
support from the urban poor. The AKP used Islamist rhetoric to mobilize the masses that 
form its base while pursuing neoliberal policies similar to the anti-clerical PRI in Mexico. 
Because of its previous exclusion from the political system, the AKP was able to present itself 
as an agent of change, even as it relied on the same clientelist practices voters, which had led 
to popular dissatisfaction. 
 The party structure of the AKP was built not on popular participation or 
programmatic democracy but clientelist coercion. It used an organizational structure that 
"featured a highly centralized and authoritarian decision-making apparatus, several 
intermediary levels of party cadres, and a lower-tier of foot-soldiers who were rooted in 
villages and neighborhoods" (Marschall et al., 2015, p.11). High-ranking party leaders 
within the AKP exercise control throughout the organization. There is little democracy 
within the party itself, instead, "local party activists are subordinate to decisions made by 
party leaders in candidate selection and policy formulation processes even if these decisions 
are contrary to their interests" (Ayan, 2010, p.14). This structure facilitates clientelist 
relationships, "indeed, the AKPs organizational structure and strong stores of cultural and 
religious capital made it ideally suited for patron-client linkages" (Marschall et al., 2015). It 
used patronage to secure party discipline, "a number of positive incentives (material, solidary, 
purposive) given to the local party members helped consolidate authoritarianism within the 
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party" (Ayan, 2010, p.12). These incentives only grew with the AKP's rise to power. It was 
highly effective at mobilizing and rewarding party supporters and "state resources, created a 
new network of clientelism, which played a major role in AKP's success" (Marschall et al. 
2015, p. 15). Therefore clientelism and not democracy is the foundation of the AKPs 
organization and rule.  
 The close social bonds unique to clientelism are critical to how the Justice and 
Development party mobilizes its support. The religious parties the AKP sprang from were 
particularly skillful at engaging voters on a personal level; "unlike other parties in Turkey, the 
National Outlook-affiliated parties engaged in face-to-face interactions with local residents, 
canvassing apartment buildings and neighborhoods year-round" (Marschall et al., 2015, 
p.11). The AKP's clientelist networks relied on religiously affiliated social service agencies 
under their direction. Fewer restrictions on religious parties in Turkey "enabled religious 
orders to get involved in the patron-client networks characteristic of Turkey's politics" 
(Ulusoy, 2014, p.198). Thus the AKP took advantage of its social services affiliates frequent 
face-to-face interaction between mostly female party workers and their neighbors. In total, 
"the new networks of clientelism established by the AKP have proved to be a potent formula 
for electoral success among the urban poor" (Sayarı 2011, p. 94). Therefore cultivating dense 
personal connections among the urban poor and clientelist linkages through social service 
organizations is a vital strategy for the AKP. 
 Similarly, the liberalization of the economy and the establishment of electoral 
democracy were not enough to dislodge clientelist practices in Mexico. During the transition 
to multiparty rule, clientelism remained an important linkage mechanism. When PAN or 
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PRD gained the control of states, both parties continued to us clientelist linkage methods. In 
Mexico City, the progressive PRD government was rooted in clientelist practices. Tina 
Hilgers explains the PRD is for the most part organized around clientelist structures similar 
to the PRI. In her 2005 study, she shows decisions are made at the top by the leader and 
carried out by personally loyal followers. Leaders can punish workers lower down the 
hierarchy by removing them from their position. Patronage positions are imperative in 
cultivating middle rung workers, and access to government programs, especially housing, 
fuels allegiance. From the outset, the PRD centered on the leadership of Cuauhtémoc 
Cárdenas, "and the primacy of his political strategy set the party on a path of personalistic 
factions and centralized power" (Hilgers, 2008). Ideological factions coalesced around a 
central strongman or caudillo. The various strongmen maneuvered and allied to access power 
and redistribute resources to their supporters. The alliances were more often pragmatic than 
ideological (Hilgers, 2005). Andrés Manuel López Obrador later emerged as the central 
figure of the party. He supported former PRI politicians and right-wing businessmen who 
brought robust clientelist networks with them. Unfortunately, many also brought 
undemocratic and repressive practices as well. The PRD’s structure facilitated the long-term 
distribution of benefits through costly service described by Svolik and Magaloni above. 
Therefore, "much of the party's current mobilization and electoral power is based on 
clientelist relations with citizens" (Hilgers, 2005, p.42). In Mexico, "clientelism has become 
institutional and does not belong to one specific party" (Romero, 2017). Thus while the 
PRD espoused democratic ideals, they remained ensnared within their own authoritarian 
party structure. 
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 In the case of Mexico, the fissures within the PRI were decisive because they 
weakened party control of the state. The formation of the PRD shows the importance of 
clientelism in inter-elite splits. The founding of the PRD and its ability to take elite patrons 
from the PRI and their mass following of clients gave it power quickly. Also consistent with 
Levitsky and Way's findings, it is an opposition challenge resourced by the defection of elites 
with access to state resources. The break within the PRI follows with Levitsky and Way's 
observation that opposition resources often come from defecting elites and Brownlee's 
contention that inter elite splits are pivotal to understanding why incumbents fall. The PRD 
was able to take existing PRI networks and their followers away from the ruling party. A 
result of the splintering of the PRI is the party lost its monopoly over the resources of the 
state. The PRD was able to offer up its clientelist goods and access to state resources because 
it held power in the Distrito Federal at the center of the capital city. It was able to use 
clientelism to capture state power at a lower level of government, ending the PRI's total 
control of the most important city in the country. Subsequently, the PRI could not use the 
resources of the state exclusively to its advantage. They were able to use these networks, and 
the need for housing subsidies to build their base, however, their inability to capture higher 
office limited their own ability to capture state resources beyond the Distrito Federal of 
Mexico City. The formation of the PRD shows that clientelism can be useful in dislodging 
incumbent parties. In this case, clientelist networks proved decisive, in how they could help 
remove singular partisan control over the state.  
 Therefore, throughout the 1990s, the political systems of both Mexico and Turkey 
became more inclusive. Neoliberal economic policies reduced the role of the state in the 
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economy and civil society groups advocated for more a more responsive political system. 
Reforms resulted in the creation and inclusion of two noteworthy political parties: the PRD 
in Mexico and the AKP in Turkey. Despite these significant changes, clientelist linkages 
remained the primary way of connecting party leaders with their mass following. Despite the 
change from Import Substitution Industrialization to neoliberalism, the political systems of 
both countries still relied heavily on the transactional exchange of goods and services to poor 
urban dwellers occupying informal housing for political support. Instead, in the case of both, 
clientelist linkages continued to form the core of how the parties organized themselves. The 
cases validate that clientelist control of state resources can in both scarcity and abundance 
(Svolik, 2012). The cases underscore that changes in a country's economic policies alone 
cannot dislodge clientelism as the primary type of political linkage mechanism, especially 
where clientelist parties are able to control state resources. 
 The new parties of Turkey and Mexico were able to use clientelist linkages to cement 
party organization and rest control of state resources away from traditional parties. Their 
control of state resources made it more difficult for existing parties to use the resources of the 
state to create the un-level playing field discussed by Levitsky and Way. As Levitsky and Way 
make clear, an incumbent's loss of power does not result in a transition to democracy. The 
ability of the new parties to use the informal systems of clientelism to capture the state 
resources for there own ends would prove decisive in the following decade. 
Political Transformation Since 2000: Divergent Paths 
 By the end of 2002 both Mexico and Turkey had democratically elected leaders. 
However, since that time, the countries have moved in different directions. In Mexico 
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elections have been meaningful contests to determine state power and that power has been 
divided between multiple parties. The PRD continued to hold power in Mexico City, while 
the PAN held power nationally until 2012 when the PRI returned to power. The Presidency 
in Mexico has passed from the PRI to the PAN to back to the PRI and now to MORENA. 
There are other areas including freedom of the press, which limit citizen control of the state. 
Nonetheless, the country Mexico still appears to be on a trajectory towards democracy. On 
the other hand, in Turkey, the country has turned increasingly authoritarian. The AKP held 
power continuously from 2002-2015 when it lost power briefly in June only to return to 
power with new elections that November. Since the 2002 election, the Justice and 
Development Party marginalized nearly all other political parties. It has been the dominant 
force in Turkish politics for the past decade (Ulusoy, 2014). Following a coup attempt in 
July 2016, the AKP has harshly dealt with its political rivals, jailing journalists and 
opposition party members. Finally, is has now changed to a presidential system firmly 
placing power within Erdoğan's hands. While both countries sought to reduce state 
involvement in the economy, little was done to address the inequality at the heart of 
clientelism. As such politics remained highly transactional. In Mexico there was a more 
fundamental push for democratization especially by civil society groups outside of political 
parties focused on guaranteeing the fairness of elections and creating transparency in 
government. In Turkey reform centered around the inclusion of formerly excluded political 
parties and the control of the state through elections. The power necessary to secure tenure 
remained a critical issue for the masses. Differences in the use of state power in the housing 
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formalization process are an important reason for the different regime trajectories of the two 
countries. 
 Theoretically, the change to a neoliberal economic policy should have reduced 
opportunities for patronage and clientelism in housing. However, there were negative effects 
of neoliberalism that impacted the security of tenure for the occupants of informal 
settlements. Without state subsidies to industry there was no longer a need for workers or a 
reason to tolerate massive informal settlements. It incentivized formalizing property titles in 
urban areas as governments moved to make land available as a commodity on the 
international market. The commodification of land increased the incentives for speculative 
investments raising the price of housing even further. Neoliberalism also deepened already 
high levels of inequality; the spoils of renewed economic growth went disproportionately to 
elites. The changes increased price pressure as the urban poor competed for scarce urban 
space. (Keivani and Werna, 2001). Therefore, the neoliberal policies increased the 
vulnerability of the urban poor and increased the stakes of housing policy decisions.  
 Instead of reducing the importance of clientelism in informal settlements economic 
change has given governments a new tool for clientelist coercion. Generally, as countries 
grow prosperous, the cost of clientelist goods grows higher; with less privation, clients can 
demand more. Patrons are required to provide more expensive items like housing. This has 
made housing subsidies a vital pathway to perpetuate clientelist networks. As such, housing 
subsidies became an important area of manipulation in clientelist systems such as Turkey and 
Mexico. Title regularization is a way clientelist parties can coerce citizens without a large 
state controlled industrial sector. The formalization casts into doubt once informal but 
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secure tenure arrangements. Crucially housing formalization requires few resources besides 
the state’s power to confer title. In short, the change to neoliberal policies did not remove the 
power relations implicit in land regularization. Moreover, the formalization process creates 
revenues, which can be channeled back into state subsidies for housing. The formalization of 
land titles allows regimes to create an uneven playing field in neoliberal economic systems. 
Even though there is less state intervention in the economy and hence fewer opportunities 
for direct distribution of rents, the reliance on the state to create legal recognition property 
rights gives ample opportunities for abuse. The singular role of the state in formalizing title 
makes this a critical area for political manipulation in countries with high proportions of 
informal settlements. Because land titling is a government function, controlling the 
formalization process is an inexpensive way for clientelist parties to coerce citizens. 
 In the context of clientelism, title regularization is not so much a solution to the 
problems created by rapid urbanization and subsequent creation of informal housing, as it is 
an expression of political power. Cueva (1987) emphasizes that laws are not a force unto 
themselves; they must be carried out by society and in concrete political and economic 
situations. Therefore, he introduces the necessity that individual agency and larger structural 
forces will vary the circumstances of informal settlements. The legal system is not something 
separate from society; it is an expression of power, primarily political and economic power. It 
permits an individual to assert a right to the land on which settlers depend on for legitimacy. 
Therefore "the forms of legitimation are thus a compromise between the actual power of the 
social agents who control the urbanization process, on the one hand, and the legal rules of 
the form of ownership involved" (Cueva, 1987, p.524). Thus he concludes the law shapes 
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illegal settlements. The case sections below will detail the different legal responses to informal 
housing by the Mexican and Turkish governments. However, Cueva makes and important 
that regulation is an act of state agency. Regularization of land tenure comes through an 
intervention by the state and turns possession into a property. In the process reconciling the 
de facto and the de jure. A key difference is the formalization processes in Turkey and 
Mexico is extent that informal or formal institutions controlled it. Neoliberalism did not 
remove the power relations involved. Land title is an extension of state power, and in 
clientelist systems, it is delivered as a result of political loyalty to powerful patrons. 
 Differences in the use of state power in the housing formalization process are an 
important reason for the different regime trajectories of the two countries. Mexico has left 
much of the existing informal housing arrangements relatively unchanged and made the 
made the process of formalization more transparent and non-partisan. The AKP party in 
Turkey has pursued policies that on their surface work against older forms of clientelism but 
in practice have given more control over state resources and regulatory control to the party. 
By controlling process, the AKP has taken advantage of housing formalization as a vehicle for 
the particularistic dispersal of state goods and found new opportunities for clientelist 
inducement and coercion. 
 In Turkey the housing formalization process became an import method of AKP 
control over society. Importantly, the AKP drew their electoral support from the growth of 
the informal settlements (Yalcintan and Erbas, 2003). Previously, "despite the rent potential, 
no political party dared to terminate such a vibrant channel for vote-seeking and wealth 
distribution" (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.6). On its face, regularization runs counter to the 
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economic interests of the very people who form the core electoral base of the party. There are 
several drawbacks to regularization for the residents of informal neighborhoods. Primarily, 
regularization leads to displacement. It destabilizes existing neighborhoods and forces 
vulnerable populations to compete for space in a now globalized market. The regularization 
regime "suffers from a total lack of social projects and economic programs for inhabitants 
creating a serious risk of displacement, dispossession and geographical relocation of poverty" 
(Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.12). As the literature reviewed earlier shows, in a clientelist 
system, privation does not run counter to the ruling party's interest. Instead, it makes the 
particularistic distribution of state benefits more powerful. The AKP was able to turn 
regularization into a tool for clientelist coercion successfully. The process of regularization 
became a way to reward supporters and to punish political enemies. 
 The election gave full control of both the central and local government to the AKP in 
2002. The AKP converted housing title regularization into a clientelist vehicle for coercion. 
Regularization of the housing market was a fundamental component of their economic plan. 
Once in power, they followed standard neoliberal policies and worked to restructure the 
housing finance sector and create a credit market for housing. Combined with currency 
stabilizations, these changes invited foreign investment in real estate, further necessitating the 
regularization of the housing market. More importantly, AKP acted aggressively to end any 
new informal settlement definitively. In 2004 a reform of the Criminal code, law no. 5237, 
made gecekondu construction, for the first time, a criminal offence to be punished by five 
years in prison (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.6).  
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 The AKP also acted decisively to deal with existing informal settlements. In Murat 
Balamir's study on the appurtenance system of shared informal multi-unit buildings, he 
posits "an exit from such relations possible only in three ways: public acquisition, unanimous 
decision of all shareholders, or the total demolition of the building" (Balamir, 1999, p.395) 
Law No. 3183 of the 1982 Constitution is the basis of current urban land arrangements in 
Turkey. It makes expropriation by the state the primary mechanism for the redevelopment of 
informal housing. In 2005, the AKP passed law No. 5393, which authorized local 
municipalities to implement transformation projects of "derelict, obsolescent, and unsafe 
(due to natural disasters) parts of cities" (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p7). The law opened up 
the possibility of the state to expropriate and redevelop informal settlements as almost all of 
housing stock of the country was at risk for earthquakes. The new law cast into doubt the 
security of tenure of almost every home in Turkey. 
 Crucially the AKP has moved to put much of the decision making over housing 
policy directly under partisan control. Legal reforms have consolidated power under the 
Municipal Housing Authority (MHA). The legal reforms made it the sole agency responsible 
for zoning Istanbul, gave it the ability to expropriate land, and provided a mandate to 
become the largest developer of housing in the country (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.7). The 
MHA oversees Turkey's Mass Housing Administration (Toplu Konut Idaresi, or TOKİ), 
which provides affordable housing at subsidized rates. TOKİ directly controls the 
construction of social housing and has considerable discretion over the projects. It is massive 
in scale: by 2015, the total number of TOKİ housing units was 432,079, and the total cost 
was $11,114,000,000. TOKİ now directly provides between five and ten percent of all of the 
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housing in Turkey. Therefore, it has considerable and singular oversight of housing policy in 
Turkey. 
 The AKP was able to use selective enforcement of the law to its advantage. With this 
power the party could simultaneously reward supporters and disperse its rivals. The process 
of redevelopment in the TOKİ program gives considerable leverage to the state in 
formalizing the housing market and determining the tenure rights of existing residents. 
TOKİ housing addresses the appurtenance system by allowing for independent, shared, or 
condominium ownership only in new construction. Significantly, it does not confer 
recognition on existing appurtenance ownership arrangements, which remain illegal (Cagdas, 
Demir and Gur, 2002, p.8). Thus the state carried out regularization primarily through 
demolishing old buildings of the informal era and creating new buildings in their place. 
Between 2004-2008, the AKP government demolished a record number of properties. In the 
fall, 2012 news reports of simultaneous demolitions around Turkey rolled out a program 
pledging 400 billion in redevelopment funds (Güneş, 2012). The squatter settlements and 
appurtenance households were tolerated only out of necessity until new plans could create a 
tabla rasa on which to confer a more explicit title.  
 AKP functionaries decide who wins and who loses in the process. TOKİ projects are 
public/private partnerships, and focused on transferring the "rightful owners" but not 
tenants into the new public housing projects (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.7). In the 
redevelopment process, the state compensates some owners with "nearby" land while others 
receive a directed payment. In most cases, the state compensates these owners, who most 
often have de facto title, with approximately one quarter the market value of their homes 
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(Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.9). The state gives owners the option to purchase flats from the 
new developments with state-subsidized credit, while they exclude tenants from the process. 
Deciding the rightful owners of cooperatively built shared units leaves citizens at the mercy 
of state officials during the redevelopment process. 
 Furthermore, law No. 3183 allows for the rearrangement of ownership boundaries. 
The law allows for up to 35% of any parcel to be used as general utility areas such as "road, 
square, and parks, auto-garage, kids garden, green area, mosque, and police office, which are 
prior necessities of the arrangement region" (Cagdas et al., 2002, p.8). The law gives the 
government wide latitude in redrawing urban boundaries. It eradicates previous measures to 
tolerate squatter and appurtenance housing solutions (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.7). It 
significantly weakens existing informal land tenure and gives significant discretion and 
subsequent room for coercion in the hands of AKP officials. 
 The AKP increased the power and autonomy of TOKİ and consolidated the party's 
control over it by moving it directly under the authority of the Prime Ministry. It also 
reduced transparency on how its massive budget gets spent by amending the Public 
Management and Control Law (No.5018) to exempt TOKİ from the internal auditing 
conducted by the Turkish Court of Accounts. Siting decisions for where to distribute these 
housing subsidies are political: "factors other than those associated housing need and demand 
play a significant role in TOKİ housing investments. This pattern is more consistent with 
clientelism than government responsiveness" (Marschall et al., 2015, p. 29). Party support 
seems to be the significant factor, "as a group, AKP winning districts receive significantly 
higher TOKİ investments—a pattern that is consistent with clientelistic linkages" (Marschall 
 67 
et al., 2015, p. 29). From the literature above, in clientelism, state power becomes primarily 
about controlling and distributing resources to supporters. Therefore, through the central 
government’s wide discretion over the program, the AKP has powerful tool through which to 
wield the state’s authority and maintain its power. 
 The large-scale formalization of housing under the TOKİ program has transformed 
clientelist linkages in Istanbul. Marschall, Aydogan, and Bulut posit that by concentrating on 
housing formalization the AKP has overcome the constraints on state resources imposed by 
neoliberal economics and created a new form of clientelism: "housing projects sponsored by 
Turkey's Mass Housing Administration (TOKİ), not only solved the resource problem but 
also allowed it to achieve efficiency gains in its clientelistic efforts" (Marschall et al., 2015, 
p.2) They show with rigorous quantitative analysis that the clientelism associated formalizing 
settlements by replacing informal housing with TOKİ housing projects has had a significant 
impact on the electoral success and continued rule of the AKP party. It is worth noting that 
these links between the housing bureaucracy overseen by the AKP and poor citizens fall short 
of the definition of authoritarian clientelism put forward by Fox (1994). It is consistent with 
what Fox calls semi-clientelism. On the other had Marschall et al., assert much of the 
existing writings on electoral politics in Turkey overlook the effects that these policies had on 
transforming the urban landscape and in turn, patron-client linkages. Specifically, the 
commodification of land drove out the less productive and lower value land uses—squatter 
settlements, irregular housing, vacant land, and green space—in favor of higher-value, capital 
intensive commercial and residential developments. For this thesis, what is paramount is the 
privileged use of state power and resources in a particularistic way to tilt the electoral system 
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in favor of the AKP. The partisan distribution of housing subsidies shows how clientelism 
can take a modern and bureaucratic form quite distant from norms of obligation and 
reciprocity derived from the traditional landlord-peasant relationship. It does not have the 
face-to-face contact of traditional forms of clientelism, and this makes repression more 
difficult. However, it is consistent with the privileged use of state resources to create the 
skewed playing field in electoral decisions described by Levitsky and Way. The main point is 
that the distribution of state resources changed the electoral landscape in Turkey in favor of 
the incumbent party. The AKP capitalized on the opportunity created housing formalization 
using the dispensation of benefits to supporters to secure its electoral dominance. 
 TOKİ provided a new avenue of patronage and created a new and tool for 
clientelism among the urban poor in Istanbul. By controlling both municipal and central 
government the AKP has near total control over the regularization process. It is also worth 
noting that there is considerable corruption in who benefits from development as 
construction contracts are rewarded to party loyalists. Despite the AKP’s claims on Islamic 
morality, the AKP’s practices strengthen the claims made earlier in the literature review that 
ideology can aid elite cohesion, but in practice, ideological goals are secondary to rent-
seeking by party elites. Clientelist housing subsidies have been indispensable to maintaining 
the AKP electoral success in Istanbul and nationally. Even controlling for traditional forms 
of clientelism and other contextual variables, TOKİ housing is significant in explaining the 
durability of the AKP's electoral success.  
 Through housing formalization, the AKP has increased its organizational capacity by 
increasing its use of state resources and state power. Levitsky and Way show that 
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organizational capacity is significant in the maintenance of competitive authoritarian 
regimes. The law provides considerable room for abuse by unevenly applying the law. The 
use of regularization laws to reward party loyalists or coerce political adversaries allows the 
AKP to skew the electoral playing field. Moreover, it is essential to how the AKP has made 
the process less transparent and more fully under partisan control. In total, the AKP's use of 
housing subsidies to manipulate elections is so excessive and one-sided that it severely limits 
political competition. Despite the change in economic policy, secure for many Turks 
housing tenure still requires the protections afforded by party loyalty. 
 The situation is quite different in Mexico. One of the principal differences between 
Mexico and Turkey is no party has attempted to definitively end informal development in 
Mexico. Instead, the housing program has mostly work in parallel and not in opposition to 
formal settlements. There have been important changes to the laws governing the various 
type of informal development, but the changes have not disrupted housing tenure, and 
provided various routes to secure title outside of demolition. There has been no expansion of 
the powers of the federal housing bureaucracy instead it remains constrained by a mandate 
that all planning takes place at a local level. As such the major agencies are mostly 
independent of partisan influence. Older forms of clientelism are still prevalent but mostly at 
a local level and there are important efforts to curtail it by the federal bureaucracy. Therefore, 
no one party is able to abuse the resources of the state in Mexico’s housing programs. 
 The most crucial of these differences is the countries approach to formalizing 
existing settlements. As discussed earlier, informal settlements present numerous problems 
for title formalization. In Mexico, there remain are several routes to formalization of existing 
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settlements depending on which type of land the informal settlement occupies. There are 
several different types of informal housing, and the type of land the housing is on has a far-
reaching effect on the regularization process. Cueva (1987) explains the three main types of 
ownership that host illegal settlements in Mexico: state property, private property, and 
communal agrarian property. Different institutional arrangements regulate formalization 
depending on the type and therefore give rise to unique forms of informality. Land invasions 
have not been frequent since 1971, and squatter settlements on private property are currently 
only a minor form of informal housing in Mexico City. Ann Varley, in a 2002 paper, shows 
ejido settlements and private settlements are much different. Owners who purchase their land 
without title and in violation of planning laws often receive infrastructure and services before 
they receive legal title through programs of tenure regularization. For squatters on private 
land, possession is secondary to ownership and the liberal market system of private property 
is maintained. In Mexico, local authorities usually tolerate illegal subdivisions and in the end 
foot the bill for establishing infrastructure and services. Title formalization can be further 
complicated by of overlapping illegalities; multiple government agencies regulate different 
violations of the law. There are other vagaries, such as multiple sales of the same property, 
which can complicate formalization efforts. The differentiation of roles of various state 
agencies also makes the tenure regularization process multifaceted in Mexico. The local 
government plays an important role, and negotiations involve multiple parties. It can be a 
long and fruitless process. Often the law is unable to resolve such disputes, and they become 
political. The "regularization of irregular settlements remains a long and cumbersome 
bureaucratic process, but the nature of the process and governmental responsibility vary 
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depending on the mode of appropriation of land and ‘on allegiance to leaders who are able to 
negotiate satisfactory with the authorities' (Connolly, 2003, p.32 as cited in Gilbert and 
Jong, 2015, p.527). In this respect, there is still a role for clientelist networks to play in 
regularizing existing settlements. In general though despite neoliberal reforms there has been 
little impetus in Mexico to disrupt the tenure status of residents. Thus a crucial difference 
between Turkey and Mexico is there approach to informal settlements.  
The most significant effort at formalizing existing informal settlements is the 1992 
constitutional change amending Article 27 of the constitution. A neoliberal reform passed by 
President Salinas, allowed the privatization and sale of communal agricultural land. The two 
types communal farms, tierras comunales and ejidos, function under the same legal rules and 
are both a common source of land for development in Mexico City. The law converted this 
communal farmland previously unavailable to formal development, but often the site of 
informal development, into land available for urban development. It established PROCEDE, 
the Program for the Certification of Ejido Land Rights and the Titling of Urban Housing 
Plots. The process began by first mapped and drawing boundaries for existing settlements. 
However, after that, the reforms allowed for the privatization and sale of communal land 
only if the full ejido assembly approved of it by significant majorities. Thus an important 
differentiation, is in Mexico the decision to formalize title is in the hands of the ejido 
dwellers and not the state. The vast majority of communal holdings voted to keep lands 
communal. The exception was peri-urban areas where the city had already encroached on 
farming. Even after the reforms, few ejidatarios were able to fully comply with municipal 
planning regulations that necessitate minimum frontages, building codes and necessary 
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services. The new regulations made selling ejido land legal, but subdividing it remained illegal 
still. Yet, illegally selling land, and then going through the formalization process proved 
much more profitable than farming the land. Together these changes this initiated a period 
of rapid development around the periphery Mexico City, particularly in the state of Mexico 
outside of the District Federal (Gilbert and Jong, 2015).  
 At the same time there have also been been significant changes to Mexico’s formal 
housing market. In contrast to Turkey, the formal housing market in Mexico exist in parallel 
to the informal market. The most significant changes took place with the 1992 restructuring 
of the housing finance system. The laws established The National Housing Fund for Private 
Sector Workers (Instituto del Fondo National de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores, or 
INFONAVIT) and Federal Mortgage Society (Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal, or SHF). 
INFONAVIT is "entirely funded by the country's Retirement Savings System (Sistema de 
Ahorro para el Retiro, or SAR)" (Hsu, 2008, p.34). Workers can use this money for a down 
payment on a house. They grant loans at below-market interest rates directly to workers. 
INFONAVIT was responsible for more than 50 percent of all domestic mortgages in 2006 
(Hsu, 2008). The SHF, meanwhile, provides liquidity to the mortgage market through a 
25% loan guarantee. In the secondary market, it also guarantees timely payment of principal 
and interest. These were neoliberal attempts to formalize housing in Mexico. It led to a 
boom in mortgages and large subdivision development. Two government agencies account 
for the bulk of housing funding in Mexico. Thus the housing finance system in Mexico is 
almost entirely dependent on the state. However, an important difference from Turkey, is 
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the government agencies in charge of housing operate largely independently from partisan 
influence and do not build housing directly.  
 Despite the heavy involvement of the state, the national housing programs 
implemented in Mexico appear to be mostly programmatic and less particularistic than in 
Turkey. Jenny Schuetz in her wonderfully titled 2008 study, Are Mortgage Loans the New 
Toasters? The Roles of Housing Demand and Political Patronage in Mexican Housing Finance 
concludes that political motivation played a relatively small role in the allocation of loans in 
the elections she studied in the 1990s. She found that the distribution of housing mortgages 
mostly followed the criteria created by the professional administration. Schuetz does not find 
rampant use of housing funds to cement clientelist networks in Mexican housing policy. She 
states "the governance structure of the lending agencies, particularly the involvement of 
private-sector employers and large national developers, may have constrained the ability of 
the PRI to manipulate federal lending for political gain" (Schuetz, 2008, p.2). The 
multiplicity of actors is an important difference from the housing program in Turkey where 
sites are developed directly by the government. Instead in Mexico, many of the institutions 
responsible for housing subsidies are able to operate independent of partisan influence.  
 At the same time, in contrast to Turkey, efforts to develop a formal housing market 
have been unsuccessful and informal housing has remained in place. Mortgages finance only 
6% of homes in Mexico versus 67% in the United States (Hsu, 2008). Instead, banks lend 
only to the wealthy (Herbert et al., 2012, p.12). Because of its links to the social security 
system INFONOVIT the most extensive program targets mostly middle-income workers 
employed in the formal sector. However, it relies on formal employment and the social 
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security system. Hence, "the share of workers in 2010 that were unaffiliated with the social 
security system that would make them ineligible to borrow through these organizations was 
55 percent, which …still left a majority of workers outside of the system" (Herbert et al., 
2012). None the less, Hsu reports there is a need for an additional 6 million homes 
nationally, which is a massive amount considering the formal market only produces 750,000 
units per year. Mexico is estimated to need about 500,000 new units a year to meet 
household growth (Herbert et al., 2012; Hsu, 2008; Gilbert and Jong, 2015). Again this 
shows the formal housing market functions only in conjunction with the informal housing 
development. 
 The parties have displayed significant programmatic differences in their approaches 
to housing. After the PRI lost control of Mexico City in its first direct mayoral election since 
the revolution in 1997 and the presidency in 2000 it has opened the way for the growth of 
programmatic policy solutions. The result has been a diversity of approaches to housing. The 
PAN worked to strengthen the mortgage market and subsidized large-scale suburban 
building programs. Mortgage lending through the government increased exponentially after 
the election of Vincent Fox in 2000. Thus, "the Fox administration (2000–06) and the 
Calderon administration (2007–12)––both Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) governments––
provided 2.3 million and 7 million homes respectively across Mexico (Gilbert and Jong, 
2015, p.524). At the same time Bando Dos, pursued by the PRD, sought to create more 
density and rehabilitate the Distrito Federal in Mexico City. It resulted in considerable 
investments in the central city and a corresponding rise in prices. Then again, the return of 
the PRI to the presidency in 2012 prompted a significant change in policy away from large-
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scale suburban development in favor of channeling development more towards vertical 
housing in central areas near transit (Gilbert and Jong, 2015). Thus there are significant 
programmatic differences in housing policy between the PAN, PRI, and PRD.  
 Further complicating the situation, the housing built by the formal sector was of low 
quality and poorly planned. During the incumbency of the PAN in the presidency and PRD 
in Mexico City land and housing prices in the central boroughs of the Distrito Federal rose 
by 30-50%. The rise in land prices made centrally located land too expensive for most 
developers and buyers in the INFONOVIT program. Only by developing cheap land on the 
periphery could they keep the housing affordable. Ortega-Alcazar (2006) expounds, "thus, a 
large sector of the population which is unable both to afford rising prices in the centre and to 
find housing in the rest of the Federal District, has been expelled to the neighbouring State 
of Mexico, where commercial builders are developing massive subdivisions of low-quality 
affordable housing" (para. 4). However, the greater distances meant sprawl. This increased 
distances from existing infrastructure made it harder to provide services, which raised the 
cost for transportation, electricity, wastewater treatment, and water systems. The poor 
quality and lack of services in new housing developments led to high vacancy rates in new 
developments in peripheral areas, sometimes reaching 45% (Gilbert and Jong 2015). Thus, 
"a 2010 INFONAVIT study estimated that two out of every ten homes purchased with 
financing from the agency were uninhabited" (Herbert et al., 2012, p.18). Thus, the formal 
housing market in Mexico remained unable to meet the needs of most Mexicans. 
 In Mexico, self-built housing remained the predominant mode of housing 
production. Despite significant state investment formal housing production was not able to 
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meet demand. In 2005, irregular settlements represented 60% of housing construction 
(Connolly, 2009). As of 2006, "60% of the total population in the metropolitan area live in 
‘popular' settlements – former squatter settlements characterised by a precarious legal status 
and service provision" (Ortega-Alcazar, 2006, para. 5). In Mexico City, according to 
Rosenthal, "whilst there is increasing deterioration and loss of housing in the working-class 
districts in the centre, where the capacity for more profitable uses of the land is growing, the 
low-income population is increasing significantly, a population that is turning to the 
unofficial market in order to meet its housing needs" (Rosenthal, 2006, para. 5). In 2010 
near the end of the PAN administration, the situation had not fundamentally changed. The 
census that year "found that a third of the housing stock was built by the current owner and 
more than 60 percent was produced outside of the formal sector" (Herbert et al., 2012, 
p.18). Cost is a significant determinant; the upfront costs of informal housing acquisition are 
five to eight times lower than for formal housing (Herbert et al., 2012). Often informal 
housing has better access to transportation and other services. Thus, in Mexico, unlike 
Turkey, no party has committed itself to the end of informal housing. Instead, the 
regularization process lends itself to the decentralized clientelism that has taken hold of 
Mexico in now that multiple parties hold state power.  
 The different levels of government divide power over housing production in Mexico. 
The division of power between local and federal governments remains a check on a single 
party taking full control of the state and reaping the benefits of the formalization process. 
The bulk of resources, both human and financial, are in the federal government. However, 
unlike Turkey, the constitution mandates that planning take place at the local level (Gilbert 
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and Jong, 2015). The alternation of power at the federal government has pushed 
Clientelism, patronage, and other forms of corruption to the municipal level.  
There is an important diffusion of power between the professional staff in place at the federal 
level and local officials from various parties. The division of power between the PRD's 
control of Mexico City and the alternation of power between multiple parties at a Federal 
level in Mexico has led to a less ability of a single party to capture the state, and as a result, 
housing tenure has become more independent from political manipulation.  
 It is worthwhile to examine how the diffusion of local control impacts clientelism. 
The Distrito Federal, which entails the central business district and adjacent neighborhoods, 
and the State of Mexico that oversees the surrounding communities, create a fragmented 
form of government. There is little coordination between the two. Alfonso Xavier Iracheta 
Cenecorta in Mexico City: Governing the Mega City (2006) explains that the metropolitan 
region of Mexico City "involves 79 executive bodies in 3 areas of government; they legislate 
for 63 legislative zones and at least 80 territorial plans and programmes exist, for ‘planning'" 
(para. 1). Of the 19.5 million Mexicans who inhabit the area, 56% live in the 59 suburban 
districts of the State of Mexico the remaining 44% in the 16 neighborhoods of the Federal 
District. Mexico City's growth has leveled off, but the suburban districts State of Mexico are 
expanding at a rate of 1.6% per year. Another 10 million people live in the sub-cities 
bordering the state of Mexico. There is a lack of effective coordination among all of these 
governing bodies. As a result "legislation, planning and urban taxation (tax on property), 
barely have any common ground, since neither body considers the other in its institutional, 
governing and public policy decisions" (Iracheta Cenecorta, 2006, para. 2). In a multi-party 
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state, this creates considerable problems for resource management, transportation, and 
especially housing, in the region. The federal bureaucrats professionally administer housing 
programs. It has to distribute funds across several jurisdictions that include multiple different 
parties.  
 Mexico has made advances in creating a more transparent housing market. Since 
2004 it has made progress, including measuring housing prices, tracking development, and 
assessing the quality of the housing stock. Fox (1994) puts forward the idea that in order to 
move from a clientelist system, where the distribution of particularistic distribution of goods 
is fundamentally coercive, towards the distribution of goods based on citizenship it requires 
both autonomous social movements and reformist state managers. There is significant 
evidence that reformist state managers are claiming more independence for state agencies in 
Mexico in the federal housing bureaucracy, even as clientelist practices remain entrenched at 
a local level. One effort, The Index of Municipal Competitiveness in Housing (INCOMUV) 
rates the 402 most significant municipalities in 78 areas to determine the capacity of the 
local government to plan and manage housing development (Herbert et al., 2012). 
INFONOVIT collaborates with SEDESOL and the National Institute for Federalism and 
Municipal Development (INAFED) to help municipalities create a formal housing market. 
It does so through efforts to improve housing conditions, strengthen the local bureaucracy, 
and increase investor and developer confidence. Another, program, Municipal 
Competitiveness in Housing (PCMV) is a voluntary effort to boost local capacity and 
increase transparency led by INFONOVIT. The program grades municipalities on 
habitability, competitiveness, good governance, and municipal solvency. However, the 
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PCMV does not have widespread participation. Of 2,400 municipalities, only 67 
participated, and of these, a paltry 22 received a positive grade (Herbert et al., 2012). Those 
areas with the most opaque land use regulations are the least likely to participate. Because 
"the PCMV could reveal a de facto permit-granting arrangement in which local authorities 
permit development based on their interests rather than compliance with any publicly 
available plan" (Herbert et al., 2012, p.26). Therefore the federal bureaucracy is working to 
create a transparent housing finance system; however, clientelism at a municipal level 
continues to impede those efforts.  
 In conclusion, the PRI, PAN, and PRD governments in Mexico implemented a 
more decentralized and democratic housing program in Mexico. The different formal 
institutions, in particular, federalism in land use planning decisions and the varied routes to 
formalization mean it has been difficult to end the production of informal housing in 
Mexico. It also means the informal practices of clientelism and housing in Mexico have 
remained localized, and not at the same scale as the AKP created in Turkey through the 
TOKI program. The existence of federal programs to improve transparency suggests a state 
apparatus working for independence from political parties. In all this shows efforts by 
reformist state managers to make housing more regular and transparent at the expense of 
clientelist party control. Overall, it is a far cry from the AKP's successful efforts to put land 
use and housing decisions under party control. Thus, a significant development in Mexico is 
that the Federal bureaucracy has remained independent and professional, while clientelism in 




 This thesis looked at clientelism, the informal distribution of state resources for 
political support, as critical to regime type. Scholars of clientelism explain it is ubiquitous, 
found in both democratic, hybrid, and authoritarian regimes. In total, the literature shows 
that clientelist parties function in a fundamentally different manner than programmatic 
parties. Where programmatic parties provide society a choice of policy for the distribution of 
resources, clientelist parties exist to gain power through the particularistic distribution of 
state resources to followers. Clientelism is key to maintaining party cohesion and the stability 
of authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Control over the distribution of state resources shapes 
and an incumbent government’s ability to withstand economic crisis and political challenges. 
A key to regime durability is the combination of the formal party apparatus with informal 
clientelist relationships.  
 Clientelism is particularly crucial to understanding hybrid regimes; those cases were 
the formal institutions rely on elections, but the use of state resources prevents electoral 
contests from being genuinely fair and democratic. In these regimes the informal relations of 
clientelism can overtake the formal democratic apparatus when the use of state resources 
shapes the outcome of elections. In these cases, the party has captured the state for its use. 
Recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of informal institutions and how partisan 
capture can erode the effectiveness of the state. The literature shows the particularistic 
distribution of state resources over a prolonged period through the party, in short, clientelist 
linkages, are fundamental to competitive authoritarian regimes. In authoritarian regimes, 
clientelist linkages also play a vital role. Parties allow dictators to control the state and 
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society. Through control of the state bureaucracy, they are able to distribute rents and 
patronage positions to followers. Through the temporal distribution of goods and 
hierarchical structure of benefits, parties are able to extract a sunk investment in maintain the 
regime. Thus the incentive structures of clientelist parties based on rent-seeking are counter 
run counter to citizen control of state resources. Partisan abuse of state resources through 
clientelist structures can make elections to determine who holds power unfair to the extent 
that they can change a regime from democratic to competitive authoritarian even without 
changing its other formal institutions.  
 The case studies examining clientelism in Turkey and Mexico show how clientelist 
parties' have historically used housing to coerce party loyalty. The creation of clientelist 
networks played an important role in building the state in the first decades of the republics. 
Clientelist parties in both countries were part of populist mobilizations of the urban masses 
and their incorporation into an electoral system. By taking advantage of the inequality 
inherent in urbanization, parties established clientelist linkages to citizens. Consistent with 
populism elsewhere, through clientelism elites were able to maintain control and prevent the 
full political incorporation of the masses into the political system. Instead, party bosses 
gained agency at the expense of citizen control of the state. In both Mexico and Turkey 
systems of party-based clientelism were entrenched over the latter half of the twentieth 
century.  
 There have been important changes in the political systems of Mexico and Turkey, 
but coercive systems remain. The earthquakes provided a critical juncture in both countries 
that combined with the global push for neoliberal political and economic reform that 
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encourage a process of title formalization. However, the push against populist institutions 
had different results in Turkey and Mexico. Reforms made elections more broad-based and 
consequential. The electoral systems of Mexico and Turkey temporarily transformed with 
the election of the PRD, PAN and the AKP parties. Still, the parties did not necessarily as a 
result become programmatic. The clientelist distribution of goods remained an essential 
factor in how these parties functioned and how they distributed the resources of the state. 
The importance of rent-seeking and the accumulation of power for the party have remained 
significant.  
 Informal housing in both Turkey and Mexico has also continued to be an important 
locus of clientelist practices. Housing is a window into how parties use the resources of the 
state to control elections. The case studies show how clientelist structures find new 
opportunities even amidst political and economic transition. Even after these countries 
moved away from ISI economic policies, land tenure formalization provided ample new 
ground for coercion and clientelism. Power over land tenure is key component of both 
historic and modern clientelism. As formalization is purview to the state, controlling the 
formalization process is an impactful and inexpensive way for clientelist parties that control 
the process to coerce citizens. Recently, both countries have launched sizable housing 
programs to increase formal housing. The use of housing subsidies to gain electoral support 
is an example the using state resources to create a skewed playing field in elections.  
The results show that in Mexico, the PRI was not able to convert housing subsidies into 
votes while the AKP has created a new semi-clientelist system that is highly effective in 
mobilizing support and suppressing dissent.  
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 The cases show the ability to gain, or failure to maintain control of state resources is 
critical a clientelist party's ability to maintain power. Fissures within the ruling party and the 
migration of powerful clientelist bosses to opposition parties weakened the PRI's control over 
housing resources. Instead, the PRI lost its control over critical levers of power. The split 
within the party allowed the PRD to emerge and use similar clientelist tactics to gain power 
in Mexico City. Clientelist leaders were able to deliver an instant opposition and when 
effectively contest the PRI for state power. The efforts by civil society groups made election 
fraud more difficult. The combined efforts of these groups made a powerful and lasting push 
for democratization. The breakdown of clientelist networks under its control and the 
subsequent loss of its monopoly on the resources of the state checked PRI power in Mexico. 
While the PRI lost singular control of the state, in Turkey, the AKP has placed more state 
resources under its control. Its massive housing subsidies have become less and less 
independently controlled by the state bureaucracy, and are instead increasingly under the 
purview of the AKP itself. It has used this power to create a skewed electoral playing field to 
keep power. A notable difference in Mexico's democratization and Turkey's authoritarian 
turn is the PRI lost its ability to monopolize the resources of the state while the AKP has 
been able to exert such control. In all, it shows clientelist parties' capture of the state can 
determine if regimes are democratic or authoritarian. 
 The level of control of the state has had important effects on how Mexico and 
Turkey have implemented housing policies aimed at regularizing the title of informal 
settlements. The Mexican case also shows the state bureaucracy itself is an agent in the 
process. The federal housing bureaucracy in Mexico has become more independent and put 
 84 
systems of transparency to prevent clientelism in place. Under PAN, the Fox and Calderon 
administrations, state agencies acted independently of the ruling party. The localization of 
administrative control over land use planning has kept power distributed among multiple 
parties. In Turkey, the AKP was able to move many functions of the federal agency in charge 
of housing under party control. Because land-use planning is under the central government, 
it has been easier to consolidate regularization into a vehicle for coercion. Thus, clientelist 
parties' ability to control the distribution of state housing subsidies and guarantee tenure has 
shaped the different political trajectories of Mexico and Turkey. 
 The case studies suggest that the control of the functions and resources of the state by 
parties is key to evaluating regimes. More empirical research on the mechanics of partisan 
capture of the state and its consequences would help evaluate how informal systems work 
and affect state strength and service provision. The case studies suggest that in order for a 
country to democratize, the state must be sufficiently independent to prevent the control of 
state resources from swinging the election. Further research should be done to explore how 
partisan capture of state resources affects democratization in these cases. State capture effects 
on regimes would be a new and compelling variable in future work to understand 
authoritarian and democratic regimes. 
 In all this thesis has shown independent of ideology, clientelist networks prevent 
democratic participation by the masses and coercively maintain control of society. 
Clientelism forces the masses that see politics as a vehicle involved in obtaining benefits and 
not creating broad-based policies. One reason for clientelism's appeal to party leaders is that 
it gives them power without accountability. A key point, which comes out of the literature 
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on clientelism, is that the system thrives on privation. It capitalizes on society not producing 
enough of a particular good. It is intrinsic to rapid urbanization, and the shortage of housing 
and other services it creates. In systems that rely on clientelist linkages, political parties are 
incentivized to continue to manipulate access to goods in order to gain allegiance. The global 
rise in inequality means studies of clientelism will continue to be relevant to understanding 
political systems. The shift to neoliberal economic policies alone will not create democracies. 
Democratization requires a committed effort to create citizen control of the state. 
 The difficulty in obtaining housing remains a major political issue globally. Housing 
is particularly vital in other developing countries where rapid urbanization continues. 
Allowing informal housing is still a common solution. The cases show the importance of 
tenure security over title formalization. In Turkey, the AKP’s ban on informal housing made 
tenure insecure. In Mexico, reforms to the constitution made the land rights on ejido 
dwellers more secure and placed decision of tenure in under citizen control. The AKP has 
effectively used housing formalization to reward supports and cement their grip on power. 
Understanding how clientelist parties use housing is useful for understanding their political 
systems. It will also affect the quality of life for citizens. Housing will remain an acute need 
and source of political manipulation. The extent to which housing remains a clientelist good 
or an objective of policy programs will have a significant and enduring effect on the political 
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